DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-1983
During 1983, the seventeenth year of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA),' the Reagan administration continued its efforts to restrict
governmental disclosure. 2 The Administration released and then
suspended portions of National Security Decision Directive No. 84 on
Safeguarding National Security Information (NSDD 84), 3 a provision
intended to prevent leaks of sensitive security information. In addition,
the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) issued its guidelines
for the systematic declassification of sensitive foreign information, 4 in
compliance with the controversial 1982 Executive Order 12,356.5
Meanwhile, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy responded
to the administration's policies by issuing a restrictive fee waiver
policy. 6 Attacks on the FOIA continued in Congress, too; Senator
Orrin Hatch reintroduced his bill known as the Freedom of
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. See Note, Developments Under the Freedom of InformationAct-1982, 1983 DUKE L.J.
390 [hereinafter cited as Developments-1982]. For discussion of developments under the FOIA
in prior years, see Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1981, 1982
DUKE Li. 423 [hereinafter cited as Developments-1981]; Comment, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Aet-1980, 1981 DUKE L.J. 338; Comment, Developments Under the
Freedom ofInformation Act-1979, 1980 DUKE L.J. 139; Note, Developments Under the Freedom
of Information Act-1978, 1979 DUKE L.J. 327; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1977, 1978 DUKE L.J. 189; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1976, 1977 DUKE L.J. 532; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 366; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1974, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416; Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1973, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
InformationAct-1972, 1973 DUKE L.J. 178; Project, FederalAdministrativeLaw Developments1971, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115, 136; Project, FederalAdministrativeLaw Developments-1970 Contents
andMajor Cases, 1971 DUKE L.J. 149, 164; Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments1969, 1970 DUKE L.J. 67, 72.
3. 4 GOVT DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 4, 4.4 (Apr. 12, 1983). For further
discussion see infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
4. Rules and Regulations, 32. C.F.R. § 2002 (1983). For a general discussion of these
guidelines, see infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
5. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. (1982).
For a general discussion of this order see Developments-1982, supra note 2, at 394-401.
6. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Policy: Fee Waiver Policy Guidance, reprintedin
1 GOV'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) 300,815 (Feb. 8, 1983). For a more detail discussion, see infra
notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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Information Reform Act, 7 a controversial measure that would help
businesses prevent government disclosure of trade secrets and would

permit law enforcement agencies to deny disclosure of most agency
documents.
The courts were active in 1983 in rendering new interpretations of

the FOIA. The Supreme Court of the United States and the federal
appellate courts redefined the scope of several of the FOIA exemptions,

including those concerning trade secrets, personnel files, and inter- and
intra-agency memoranda. In Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
FDA ,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit narrowed the protective coverage of the first prong of the FOIA
trade secrets exemption by authorizing disclosure of previously

privileged health and safety testing data. In contrast, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, in 9 to 5 Organizationfor Women Office
Workers v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 9

expanded the coverage of the second branch of the FOIA exemption by
reinterpreting "confidential" to include more documents. The FOIA

personal privacy exemption underwent a similar expansion and
contraction. In American Federation of Government Employees v.

United States,'0 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
abandoned precedent in holding that the privacy provision exempted
from disclosure the names and addresses of government employees

when such information is requested by a union. On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied a narrow
interpretation of the personal privacy exemption, in Arieff v. United
States Department of the Navy, " when it allowed the Department of

the Navy to release information on drug orders placed on behalf of
members of Congress. Finally, the Supreme Court held in FTC v.

Grolier12 that the FOIA inter- and intra-agency memoranda exemption
7. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For a general discussion of this bill, see ifra notes
17-43 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the former version of this bill, see
Developments-1982, supra note 2, at 391-94.
The bill introduced by Senator Hatch is the same bill that did not pass the 97th Congress.
Sen. Hatch introduced his original reform bill in that Congress, where it underwent substantial
revision in various committees. The bill that he introduced to the 98th Congress this year was the
same in form as the bill that emerged from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in the 97th
Congress. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON S.
1730 (Comm. Print 1982).
8. 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see infra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
9. 721 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1983); see infra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
10. 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 214-17, 223-40 and accompanying text,
11. 712 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see infra notes 242-56 and accompanying text.
12. 103 S. Ct. 2209 (1983); see infra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
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protected attorney work product indefinitely, without regard to the
status of the litigation for which it was prepared.
The courts also rendered several decisions concerning the
definition of an agency record for purposes of the FOIA, and addressed
whether plaintiffs who represent themselves in FOIA litigation can
recover attorney fees. In three cases before the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, 13 the court reaffirmed the standard for
what constitutes an "agency record" that it adopted in Goland v. CIA 14
According to that standard, a document is an agency record for
purposes of the FOIA if the agency possesses the document and the
agency or organization that created the document has not expressly
manifested an intent to exercise control over the document. In a fourth
case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
appeared to depart from the Goland standard;' 5 this departure seems,
however, to be an abberation. Meanwhile, a circuit split developed
between the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits over
who prevail in FOIA litigation should
whether pro se attorney litigants 16
fees.
attorney
recover
to
be able
This note reviews these recent FOIA developments. The analysis
begins with the proposed legislative changes to the FOIA. The note
proceeds to discuss initiatives wrought by the executive branch. Then
it analyzes the court decisions. It assesses the scope and impact of these
developments and suggests some of their advantages and shortcomings.
I.

A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The Hatch Bill

In 1979, the Supreme Court held in Chrysler Corp. v.Brown that
is exclusively a disclosure statute and affords [the submitter
"FOIA
the
of information to an agency] no private right of action to enjoin agency
disclosure.'' 7 As a result, a party required by law to submit information to a government agency may not, under the FOIA, obtain an injunction to prevent that agency from releasing the information to other
13. The three cases that upheld the previously established standard were: International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. National Mediation Bd., 712 F.2d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d
686 (D.C. Cir. 1983); McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see infra notes 92-118,
134-41 and accompanying text.
14. 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
15. See Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 711 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
see also infra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
16. See Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983); Cazalas v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983); see also infra notes 258-65 and accompanying text.
17. 441 U.S. 281, 282 (1979).
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parties. The Chrysler Court went on to hold that the Trades Secrets

Act18 does not create such a private right of action either. t9 The Court
held that the Administrative Procedure Act provides the sole means of

20
protecting a submitter's right to bar disclosure.
In order to protect these submitters and their information, Senator

Hatch has introduced a bill that would reform the FOIA. 2 t The "ad-

ministration-backed Hatch bill"2 2 would require an agency to notify a
submitter when a third party requests information provided by the submitter. The submitter would then be able to contest an agency's deci-

sion to disclose the information before actual disclosure, provided that
the submitter had designated the business information "confidential"

when submitted. 23

18. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982). The Act provides:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or
agency thereof, or agent of the Department of Justice as defined in the Antitrust Civil
Process Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314), publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in
any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the
course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or
agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade
secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential
statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any
person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or
copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or
examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined not more than $1,000,
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or
employment.
19. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 317. The controversy in Chrysler concerned the release by a government agency of information that a third party had submitted to the agency. Usually the third
party has submitted information pursuant to a regulation, although, sometimes submission is voluntary. In either case, the submitting party wants the information kept secret.
The problem develops when a requestor asks the agency that holds the information to disclose it under the FOIA. Currently, the agency has complete discretion whether to disclose such
information, and the true party in interest (the third party submitter) is not able to prevent the
disclosure. As a result, the submitter finds himself in a situation in which information he is required to submit is subsequently released under the guise of the FOIA and used against him by a
competitor or enemy. Not only is the FOIA misused, but it becomes in the submitter's best interest to withhold damaging information, thereby defeating the positive purposes for which the original submission was intended. Because of this situation, submitters are clamoring for a "reverseFOIA" provision, one that would allow them to force the agency to withhold information. See
infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
20. "Section 10(a) of the APA provides that '[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action . . . , is entitled to judicial
review thereof.' 5 U.S.C. § 702." Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 317. The remedy available through the
Administrative Procedure Act is indirect because the aggrieved party can only seek judicial review
after the agency has made the damaging disclosure. Damages after the fact are often insufficient
to recoup a company's actual losses.
21. The proposed Hatch Bill is S.774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
22. 4 Gov'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 5, 5.2 (Apr. 12, 1983); see supra note 7,
23. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1983). The pertinent provisions of section 4 are as
follows:
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The Hatch Bill has gained substantial momentum, principally as a

result of two separate incidents. The first occurred in September 1982,
when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mistakenly dis-

closed the formula for one of Monsanto's most profitable products, a
herbicide, to a major competitor of Monsanto in response to that competitor's FOIA request.24 The second incident occurred earlier in 1982
when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released "the ingredients and molecular structure of a new drug about to be marketed by a

major pharmaceutical company" to the competitor of that company. 25
These two incidents contributed to corporations' long-standing fears
that the commercially sensitive data that they are compelled to disclose
to government agencies would inadvertently be made available to competitors through the provisions of the FOIA. 26 The Hatch Bill would

allow submitters to protect their confidential information by supervising the agency's disclosure of such information. 27 The Senate Judiciary
Section 552(a) of title 5,United States Code, is amended by adding after paragraph (6)
the following new paragraph:...
(i) a submitter may be required to designate, at the time it submits or provides to
the agency or thereafter, any information consisting of trade secrets, or commercial, research, financial, or business information which is exempt from disclosure under subsection (b)(4);
(ii) the agency shall notify the submitter that a request has been made for information provided by the submitter, within ten working days after the receipt of such request,
and shall describe the nature and scope of the request and advise the submitter of his
right to submit written objection in response to the request;...
(B) an agency is not required to notify a submitter pursuant to subparagraph (A)
if-

(i) the information requested is not designated by the submitter as exempt from
disclosure in accordance with agency regulations promulgated pursuant to subparagraph
(A)(i), if such designation is required by the agency;...
(E) The agency's disposition of the request and the submitter's objections shall be
subject to judicial review pursuant to paragraph (4) of this subsection."
Id at 7-22
24. Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
25. 4 GOV'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 2, 12.2 (Feb. 8, 1983).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982) exempts from FOIA disclosure "trade secrets and commercial
or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." A submitter's
competitors usually make a FOIA request for commercial information provided by the submitting
corporation. Occasionally the agency makes a mistake and releases to the competitor confidential
and valuable business information from the submitter. Hatch's bill would preclude such disclosure by requiring an agency to notify the submitter whenever information stamped confidential is
requested, in order that the submitter may protect that information.
27. Representative English has introduced a counterpart to the Hatch Bill in the House. It
provides:
Sec. 2(a) Section 552(a)(4)(A) of title 5, United States Code, is amended(1)by inserting "(i)" immediately after "(4)(A)"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following:
"(ii) Each agency shall also promulgate regulations, pursuant to notice and receipt
of public comment, specifying procedures by which"(I) the agency shall, when requested by a submitter at the time of submission of
information to the agency, notify the submitter, within five days of receipt of a request,
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Committee filed its report on the Hatch Bill 28 on September 12, 1983,
and the measure was passed by a voice vote in the Senate on February

27, 1984.29
The Hatch Bill proposes a second substantial amendment of the
FOIA. This addition would affect section (b)(7),30 which exempts from

disclosure certain "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes."'3' In order for the documents to qualify under this exemption, the agency must demonstrate that releasing the information con-

tained in these investigatory records would interfere with enforcement
proceedings, or a pending trial or adjudication. Section (b)(7) also exempts from disclosure information that would invade an individual's
personal privacy, or expose a confidential source or an investigative
technique. The Hatch Bill would delete the requirement that the excluded records be "investigatory" and would expand the exemption
32
standard from records that "interfere with enforcement proceedings"
to include all such records that "couldreasonablybe expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. ' 33
that such a request for records containing such information has been made under this
section; and
"(II) a submitter or requester may submit to the agency written argument regarding
a request made for disclosure of records.
"(iii) An agency is not required to notify a submitter of the receipt of a request
under division (ii)(I) if"(I) the agency determines, prior to giving such notice, that the request for disclosure should be denied;
"(II) the disclosure is pursuant to law (other than this section) or agency rule which
requires disclosure of specific records in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue; or
"(III) the information has been published or otherwise made available to the
public.".
(b) Section 552(a)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is further amended"(C)(i) In an action under this section seeking the production of records, the court
shall determine the matter de novo, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
determination.
"(ii) In an action under this section seeking the withholding of records, the court
shall review the record of the agency's proceeding and shall uphold the agency's determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
"(iii) In any action under this section, the court may examine the contents of such
agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section";
H.R. 1247, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-7 (1983).
A provision like the Hatch Bill that authorizes a submitter, rather than a requester, a right of
action would be a reverse-FOIA bill because it reverses the processes of the FOIA, culminating in
a withholding, rather than a disclosure, when the petitioner succeeds in his action.
28. S.REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983).
29. S.774, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 CONG. REC. S1794 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
30. Id at 22.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982).
32. Id
33. S.774, 98th Cong., IstSess. § 10 (1983)(emphasis added). The following comparative
recitation of exemption (b)(7) highlights the changes proposed by the Hatch Bill. Both the Hatch
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The proposed changes to section (b)(7) present several problems.
First, the introduction of the "could reasonably be expected" standard
would provide both the courts and the agencies with broad grounds on
which to justify withholding information from the public. The bill

does not define either "reasonably" or "expected"; both terms are susceptible to flexible interpretation and application. A court or agency

could conceivably justify the withholding of almost any investigatory
record merely by stating its belief that disclosure "could reasonably be
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." Second, by lowering the threshold of interference required, the proposal would force
courts to defer more often to agency decisions to deny disclosure. Al-

though the reviewing court would still apply the standard independently, it would be difficult for the court to conclude that the agency,

which is in a better position to judge what might affect its own enforcement proceedings, erred in its assessment and that there is absolutely
no reasonable expectation that harm would result from disclosure.
The Hatch Bill would insert this expansive language in exemption
(b)(7)(D) 3 4 and b(6). 3 5 Exemption (b)(7)(D) protects confidential
sources identified in law enforcement records. Exemption (b)(6) protects personnel, medical, and similar files that, if disclosed, would subproposal and the existing Act are combined into a single model act in order to expose their differences and compare the language. The new language is designated by italic typeface, and the
language that is eliminated by the Hatch Bill is designated by brackets [ ] around the deleted
word(s).
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are:
(7) [investigatory] records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but
only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information
[would] (A) could rearonablybe expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ...
(D) could reasonablybe expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a state, local, orforeign agency or authority or any private institution whichfurnished
information on a confidentialbasis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by
an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, [confidential]
information furnished [only by the] a confidential source, . . . (F) could reasonably be
expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any naturalperson [law enforcement
personnel].
S.774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1983). Besides expanding the exemption to a reasonable expectation of interference from that of actual interference, the proposed exemption would include all
records compiled for law enforcement purposes, not just "investigatory" ones.
34. See supra note 33.
35. The following is a comparative recitation of exemption (b)(6) in the same style as that
employed for exemption (b)(7), supra note 33:
(6) records or information concerningindividuals,including compilationsor lists of names
andaddresses that couldbe usedfor solicitationpurposes[personnel and medical files and
similar files] the release of which could reasonably be expected to [would] constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
S.774, 98 Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1983). The proposed revision not only expands the exemption to
those records that might invade personal privacy (rather than only those records that would do so),
it also greatly expands the scope of records that might violate an individual's personal privacy.

384
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stantially disturb personal privacy.3 6 In both sections insertion of the

"reasonably expected" standard would expand the number of records
that an agency could withhold.37 If this language is included in
(b)(7)(D), the FOIA probably would require an agency or court to consider all publicly available information when determining whether the
requested documents should be withheld. As a result, even though the
release of a single document might not expose a confidential source, the
court could conclude that use of the disclosed information, when combined with other publicly available information, "could reasonably be
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source." Such a "totality of the circumstances" analysis gives the courts and agencies even
38
greater leeway in withholding information.
Another amendment that the Hatch Bill proposes would bar the
use of the FOIA as a discovery device in any adjudication in which the
government is a party. 39 The purpose of this proposal is to curb abuse
of the FOIA in such contexts, thus reducing the unfair burdens placed
on the government and its attorneys by opposing attorneys.40 The Ad36. See supra note 35.

37. See supra notes 33, 35. Other amendments contained in the Hatch Bill include: an increase in fees to the requester, see infra note 82 and accompanying text; an additional exemption,
(b)(10), that would restrict the export of technical data, see S.774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11
(1983); and another exemption, (b)(l 1), that provides special protection for Secret Service records.
See id

38. Exemption (b)(7)(F), regarding the physical safety of natural persons, would be amended
in the same way, see supra note 33, and would be subject to the same expansive analysis. The
scope of the exemption is further expanded by protecting "any natural person" (the new language)
instead of just "law enforcement personnel" (the old language).
39. Private litigants often use the FOIA in lieu of, or in addition to, the regular discovery
procedures available in proceedings against the government. The FOIA provides greater access to
governmental documents than normal discovery procedures, and the FOIA is not subject to the
same restrictive time limitation for its invocation. The Hatch Bill seeks to eliminate such use
through the following language:
Section 552(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(B) The time limits prescribed in subparagraph (A) of paragraph 6 shall be tolled
whenever the requester (or any person on whose behalf the request is made) is a party to
any ongoing judicial proceeding or administrative adjudication in which the Government is also a party and may be requested to produce the records sought. Nothing in this
subparagraph shall be construed to bar (i) a request for any records which are not related
to the subject matter of such pending proceeding, or (ii) a request for any records which
have been denied to a party in the course of a judicial proceeding or administrative
adjudication that is no longer pending.
S.774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1983). By tolling the time limits that control agency responses,
the provision would effectively relieve agencies of all obligation to respond to a litigant's FOIA
request for documents.
40. Recommendation 83-4 of the Administrative Conference, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,463-64
(1983)(to be codified at I C.F.R. § 305.83-4).
The Administrative Conference cited the following as ways in which the FOIA could be
abused in adjudication with the government:
The Conference believes that the use of the FOIA for discovery purposes is a matter of
valid concern to the Government because that use, unlike other uses of the FOIA, may
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ministrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) commissioned a
study of this issue and has endorsed a compromise position between the

present law and the proposed amendment. 41 The ACUS suggests continued availability of the FOIA in litigation against the government so

long as opposing parties promptly notify government counsel of any
FOIA request.42 The ACUS believes that this measure will alleviate
the present element of unfairness and reduce the burden on the
43
government.
B.

Other Legislative Developments.

Senators Barry Goldwater and Strom Thurmond have initiated
another legislative proposal that has the potential to further restrict the

FOIA. Their proposed amendment to the National Security Act would
exempt from the provisions of the FOIA certain CIA operational files
because of the sensitive nature of their content.44 The purpose of the
disadvantage the Government's position in litigation in several ways. First, a party in
litigation with the Government may obtain the release of agency records without the
knowledge of Government counsel and then seek to use those records to surprise Government counsel at trial or hearing. Second, a party in litigation with the Government
may disrupt the Government counsel's trial preparation by seeking, perhaps on the eve
of the trial or hearing, the release under the FOIA of records in the Government's litigation files. In these cases, the Government counsel must divert attention from trial preparation in order to prevent a FOIA release to an opposing party of sensitive,
nondisclosable records. Under the FOIA, unlike in discovery, the Government does not
enjoy the protection of a cut-off date after which no further requests can be made.
Third, a party in litigation with the Government may request production of the same
documents under the FOIA and in discovery, thus necessitating duplicative searches and
releases. In these cases, the Government's primary concern is not the extra burden imposed on the agency's public information office in processing the party's FOIA request,
but the burden imposed on counsel representing the Government to protect himself from
duplicative effort and to keep himself informed of the Government documents obtained
by opposing parties.
Id
41. E.A. TOMLINSON, THE USE OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT (FOIA) FOR Dis-

COVERY PURPOSES (1983)(Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States).
42. The ACUS proposes that the FOIA be amended to require such notice:
Recommendations
1. Congress should amend the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to require a
party to a judicial action or to an administrative adjudication or formal rulemaking proceeding, to which the Government is also a party, to notify counsel for the Government
promptly of any FOIA requests made by the party, by his counsel, or by some other
person acting on the party's behalf, during the pendency of the proceeding for the purpose of securing the release of agency records that may be relevant to the proceeding.
2. Congress should also provide that, if a party does not comply with this notice
requirement, the court or agency conducting the proceeding may preclude the party from
offering in the proceeding any agency records released in response to the request.
Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,461,
57,464 (1983).
43. Id
44. The following is part of the proposed additional title, National Security Act, Title VII:
"Sec. 701(a) In furtherance of the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure as set
forth in section 102(d)(3) of this Act (50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3)) and section 6 of Central Intel-
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bill, however, is not only to protect sensitive information, but also to

relieve the CIA from the burden of retrieving and reviewing these extensive files in response to FOIA requests. 45 If passed, the bill promises

to further restrict public access to agency information.
II.

EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Actions taken by the executive branch during 1983 have generated
both criticism and further refinement of the FOIA. Executive order
12,356,46 issued by President Reagan last year, has sparked substantial
criticism, 47 and has generated a backlash in Congress in the form of the
proposed Freedom of Information Protection Act.4 8 The Information
Security Oversight Office (ISOO),49 pursuant to Executive Order
12,356, issued new guidelines for the declassification of government information 5° previously classified as secret for purposes of section (b)(1),
the national security exemption. President Reagan also issued a Directive intended to restrict the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.5 1 All these actions manifest the tendency of the Reagan
Administration to favor the interest in protecting classified information
ligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g), operational files located in the Directorate
of Operations, Directorate for Science and Technology, and Office of Security of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of the Freedom of
Information Act which require publication or disclosure, or search or review in connection therewith, if such files have been specifically designated by the Director of Central
Intelligence to be"(1) files of the Directorate of Operations which document foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence operations or intelligence or security liaison arrangements or information exchanges with foreign governments or with intelligence or security services;
"(2) files of the Directorate for Science and Technology which document the means
by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through scientific and
technical systems; or
"(3) files of the Office of Security which document investigations conducted to determine the suitability of potential foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources."
S. 1324, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6 (1983).
45. 129 CONG. REC. S 16,743 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
46. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. (Supp. V.
1981). The FOIA does not apply to matters that are: "(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order;" 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1) (1982). Executive Order 12,356 establishes such criteria. For a complete discussion of
this order, see Developments-1982, supra note 2, at 394-401.
47. 129 CONG. REC. S7163 (daily ed. May 19, 1983)(statements of Sen. Moynihan); 129
CONG. REc. S4426 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1983)(statements of Sen. Leahy).
48. S. 1335, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
49. The Information Security Oversight Office is an independent agency established by President Caner in 1978. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 5-2, 3 C.F.R. 190, 201-02 (1979). It reports to
the National Security Council and to the President. President Reagan revised the mandate for
this agency in 1982. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 5.2, 3 C.F.R. 166, 175-76 (1983).
50. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
5 . See infra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
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over the interest in affording public access to government files when the
two conflict.
A. Results of Executive Order 12,356.
In 1982, President Reagan exercised his power under FOIA section (b)(1) to establish criteria that exempt from disclosure information
classified as secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy,
by issuing Executive Order 12,356. That order superseded President
Carter's Executive Order 12,06552 and attempted to correct what the
Administration perceived as an imbalance favoring public access to
records that affect national security. 53 The Reagan order created additional classification categories and eliminated its predecessor's presumption against classification, thus allowing agencies to withhold
documents more easily. The order also revised the declassification
standards that President Carter had developed. Under the Carter order,
unless a declassification date was stated at the time of the classification,
domestic information would be reviewed every twenty years and foreign information would be reviewed every thirty years, to determine
whether it was still necessary to classify it as "secret."' 54 If the information was not reviewed at the end of this time it was automatically declassified.5 5 Under the Reagan order, however, mandatory review only
occurs at the time the information is initially classified. Thus, information not given a predetermined declassification date could be classified,
and correspondingly exempt from disclosure, forever.
1. The Freedom of Information Protection Act of 1983. To
counteract the effects of the 1982 Reagan Executive Order, Senator
Durenberger introduced the Freedom of Information Protection Act of
1983.56 This bill would return the standard for the (b)(1) national security exemption to its form under President Carter. Under this proposal, an agency could withhold information in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy only when it can meet two tests: (1) the disclo52. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 706-12
(Supp. V. 1981). President Carter's order exempted information if its release "reasonably could be
expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security." Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3
C.F.R. 190, 193 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1-302 (Supp. V. 1981). In contrast, President
Reagan's order does not require that the damage be identifiable, and permits the contested records
to be evaluated "in the context of other information." Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R.
166, 169 (1983). Reagan's changes expand the number of records that are exempted under (b)(1).
53. For a general discussion of Executive Order No. 12,356, see Developments-1982, supra
note 2, at 394-401.
54. Id at 400.
55. Id
56. S. 1335, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S7161-65 (daily ed. May 19, 1983).
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sure of the data could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable
damage to national security, and (2) the agency, having balanced the
need for secrecy against the public interest in disclosure, found the former to be more compelling.5 7 This new standard would require a
stronger justification for nondisclosure from the agency than the standard set out in Executive Order 12,356. Under the Reagan standard,
the damage need not be identifiable, and the agency need not balance
its interest against the public interest. 58
2. New GuidelinesRegarding Declassficationof ForeignInformation. In January of 1983, the ISOO issued new guidelines for the systematic declassification review of foreign government information.5 9
60
Under the previous guidelines, promulgated under the Carter order,
declassification would occur in one of three ways: (1) a predetermined
"declassification date" was set at the time the documents were classified
as secret; (2) selected information was subject to item-by-item review at
the end of thirty years to determine whether classification was still necessary; or (3) if information fell into neither of these categories it was
6t
subject to mandatory declassification once it became thirty years old.
The new guidelines expand the category of information not subject
to a mandatory thirty-year declassification review by giving the agencies greater discretion to withhold the records for an extended time.
The new guidelines do not require the agencies to make any decisions
with respect to the thirty year limit if the information is identified for
item-by-item review under section 2002.6 of the new guidelines. 62 In
addition, the guidelines give the agencies complete freedom to determine whether to declassify those records included within section
2002.6.63
57. S. 1335, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S7162-63 (daily ed. May 19, 1983).
58. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. (Supp. V.
1981).
59. General Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of Foreign Government Information, 32 C.F.R. § 2002 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ISOO guidelines]. These guidelines revise
a provision of the Code of Federal Regulations that regulates national security information.

60. 32 C.F.R. § 2002 (1982).
61. Id § 2002.1. In other words, under the Carter guidelines, all information that was not
dealt with specifically (records subject to item-by-item review or those with a prior declassification
date) must be reviewed before classification beyond the thirty year limit is permitted.
62. Id § 2002.6 (1983).
63. Id § 2002.4(d). Section 2002.6 encompasses all sensitive foreign intelligence information. Read in isolation, these provisions appear to give agencies more control over the declassification of sensitive foreign material. But when they are read in context with the recently issued
presidential directive, see infra notes 64-79, the provisions create a presumption for extending
periods of classification.
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B. NationalSecurity Decision Directive on UnauthorizedDisclosure.
In 1983, President Reagan issued a directive designed to safeguard
national security information. 64 This directive, which represented per-

haps the most important development in 1983 affecting the free flow of
information, was intended to prevent unauthorized disclosure by government officials to the news media of classified information. 6 5 On

February 14, 1984, as a result of heavy criticism and compliance difficulties, "President Reagan. . . decided to suspend key provisions" of
66

this directive.
Rescission does not detract from the importance of the order; there

are indications that the rescission was politically motivated, and that
President Reagan intends to reissue the order if he is reelected. 67 The
directive provided five safeguards against disclosure of sensitive infor-

mation.6 8 Two of the more important safeguards ordered agencies to
adopt procedures to implement polygraph tests of agency employees

69
and to require agency employees to sign nondisclosure agreements.
64. National Security Decision Directive 84 (Mar. 11, 1983)(copy on file with author) [hereinafter cited as NSDD 84].
65. Id.
66. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
NSDD 84 is comprised of five numbered provisions, see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
"In order to permit sufficient opportunity to resolve concerns raised in the Congress concerning
provisions of NSDD 84, the President has directed that implementation of two provisions of that
directive be held in abeyance." Memorandum: Implementation of National Security Decision
Directive-84 (Feb. 17, 1984)(copy on file with author). The Presidential Memorandum suspends
paragraphs lb and 5 of NSDD 84. See supra note 68.
67. It appears that President Reagan wants to reduce the controversy that the directive has
created. Several Administration officials said Mr. Reagan's decision was aimed at eliminating a
potential political problem caused by widespread criticism of the far-reaching order.
One official said the White House was hoping "to remove it as a sore spot, a source of controversy" in an election year. Another suggested that if the White House did not reach a compromise
with Congress, the President could reissue the order if reelected. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at
A20, col. 4.
68. 4 GOV'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 4, 4.4 (Apr. 12, 1983). The presidential
directive ordered the following safeguards against unlawful disclosure of properly classified data:
1. Each agency handling classified information should adopt internal procedures
covering (a) nondisclosure agreements, upon access to classified data, (b) prepublication
review, (c) standardized forms, and (d) media contacts.
2. Each agency should adopt internal procedures to govern the reporting and investigation of unauthorized disclosures of such data.
3. The Justice Department is to review and investigate potential violations of criminal law, even though administrative sanctions may be sought instead of criminal
prosecution.
4. Interagency agreements between the FBI and other criminal investigative agencies aren't to be modified or precluded.
5. Agencies should revise their regulations and policies to provide for polygraph
tests, but within limits ....
Id
69. Id These two safeguards are the most controversial because they regulate freedom of
speech, arguably in violation of the first amendment.

390
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The agencies were ordered to administer the polygraph tests "when appropriate, in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures of
classified information. ' 70 The nondisclosure agreement provision authorized agencies to compel government employees to sign contracts,
enforceable by the Justice Department, that would prevent these em-

ployees from writing or discussing anything about their work without

prepublication clearance, even after they leave governmental service. 7'

The provision would apply to any government employee who has access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI),72 information
which receives special protection. 73 Before the directive, only CIA employees were required to sign such contracts. 74 The provision would

also allow the Justice Department to bring a civil action against an
individual who, without authorization, releases information deemed

sensitive. The possible ramifications of this contractual provision have
generated considerable adverse reaction.75 "It will give those in power
a new and powerful weapon to delay or even suppress criticism by
''
those most knowledgeable to voice it. 76
70. NSDD 84, supra note 64, at 2.
71. Id "That day [Mar. 1I]a Presidential directive was issued requiring a wide range of
additional present and future employees to obtain clearance from the Government before publishing material that might be classified." Abrams, The New Effort to Control Informaion, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 25, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 25, col. 1.
72. The number of people with access to such sensitive information exceeds 200,000. 129
CONG. REC. S7163 (daily ed. May 19, 1983)(statements of Sen. Moynihan).
73. 129 CONG. REc. S4426 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1983) (statements of Sen. Leahy). "Up to now
only the employees of the CIA and equally sensitive agencies have been required to enter such
agreements. The agreements will be policed with lie detector tests." Id
74. See generally Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). Snepp worked for the CIA
and, as a condition of his employment, signed a prepublication contract with the CIA not to
release any classified information without first obtaining clearance. Snepp wrote a book about
certain CIA activities in South Vietnam based on his experiences as a CIA agent. The CIA
brought a breach of contract action, seeking an injunction requiring the former agent to submit to
prepublication review in the future and an order imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit on all profits that Snepp earned from publication. The Supreme Court not only
validated the use of these prepublication contracts by the CIA, but granted the CIA each remedy
it requested.
A former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, who had agreed not to divulge
classified information without authorization and not to publish any information relating
to the Agency without prepublication clearance, breached a fiduciary duty when he published a book about certain agency activities without submitting his manuscripts for prepublication review.
Id at 507.
75. [A] month ago today, the Reagan Administration publicly released a contract that
has no precedent in our nation's history. ...
• . .The new requirement, warns the American Society of Newspaper Editors, is
"peacetime censorship of a scope unparalleled in the country since the adoption of the
Bill of Rights in 1791."
Abrams, supra note 71, at 22.
76. Id "More important, it seems at odds with the concept that widespread dissemination
from diverse sources furthers the public interest." Id
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The directive would compound the current difficulties regarding
excessive classification.7 7 Now that Executive Order 12,356 gives agencies unfettered discretion to determine which documents to label "secret," the President's directive would allow the administration to
operate without public scrutiny more often. By designating materials
as classified, the government could mute those persons who, because of
their access to overclassified information, are in the best position to
criticize and expose nefarious practices by the government. These nondisclosure contracts would enable the government to conduct its operations in complete secrecy, an environment anomalous to the FOIA and
the objectives for which it was designed. The directive has ignited criti79
78
cism from FOIA proponents in both the House and the Senate.
C. DiscouragingFee Waivers.
The FOIA allows agencies to recover from requesting parties only
the cost of searching for and duplicating requested records.80 If the
requesting parties can show that release of the information benefits the

public, however, they do not have to pay this fee.8 ' Traditionally,
agencies have had substantial discretion in determining whether to
77. A recent survey by the Information Security Oversight Office of classification in the year
1980 revealed that 7150 officials had original authority to classify information as secret, but they
had delegated that authority to 133,000 other officials. "In a random check, the oversight office
estimated that 600,000 papers had been classified without authority; another 800,000 had been
classified unnecessarily." The Problem of Keeping So Many Secrets Secret, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19,
1983, at B6, col. 3.
The problem is compounded when it is realized that the March 11 directive, see supra note
64, constrains many of these 133,000 employees from ever revealing what they know. The potential for an exponential increase in classification is devastating. "The rule [March I1 directive]
restricts at least 100,000 Defense Department officials alone-both on the job and in retirement."
Strasser, Reagan's Secrecy Campaign, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 1983, at 38, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as
Reagan's Secrecy Campaign].
78. See Use of Polgraphsand PrepublicationReview: Hearingson March 11 PresidentialDirective Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights andthe Subcomm. on Civil Service of
the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)(statement of Rep. Schroeder)(unpublished transcripts). See 4 GOV'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 5, 5.4 (May
10, 1983).
79. 129 CoNG. REc. S7163-64 (daily ed. May 19, 1983)(statements of Senators Moynihan and
Biden); id at S4426 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1983)(statement of Sen. Leahy).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982). "These costs are only a fraction of the true costs of answering a FOIA request. The cost of reviewing documents, editing out exempt material, and other
processing accounts for the bulk of the expense of FOIA." 129 CONG. REC. S2631 (daily ed. Mar.
11, 1983)(statement of Sen. Hatch).
81. The current section provides: "Documents shall be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge where the agency determines that waiver or reduction of the fee is in the public
interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefitting the general
public." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982).
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that FOIA regrant a fee waiver. Yet, critics have still maintained
82
quests generate excessive costs to the government.

In response to this criticism, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy (OLP) issued guidelines on January 7, 1983, on when to
grant a fee waiver. "[T]he new guidance reflects a change in tone from
an emphasis on generosity (favoring the individual directly) to one of
preserving public funds and enforcing payments due (favoring taxpayers collectively and indirectly). '83 The guidelines direct agencies to
84
grant a fee waiver only when five separate criteria have been met.

This policy has drawn so much criticism in both the House85 and the
Senate 86 that Senator Leahy has introduced a bill called the Freedom

of Information Improvement Act 87 that would mandate the waiver of
fees in certain specific circumstances. If Congress does not reverse the
82. See S.744, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983); 129 CONG. REc. S2690-91 (daily ed. Mar. 11,
1983)(statement of Sen. Hatch). A section of the Hatch Bill proposes an amendment to the present
FOIA fee provision that will raise the price of the FOIA apparatus to the requester-consumer. It
proposes to allow agencies to charge fees for any costs directly and reasonably attributable to
search, duplication, and other FOIA processing activities. The agency could also charge the fair
market value for commercially valuable technological information generated by the government
at substantial cost. S.774, 98th Cong., IstSess. § 2 (1983); 129 CONG. REC. 2691 (daily ed. Mar.
11, 1983)(statement of Sen. Hatch). In essence, the bill would authorize agencies to shift most of
the costs to the requester.
These provisions could have a restrictive effect at two different levels in a FOIA request.
First, the actual cost of obtaining agency documents will increase and will discourage requesters
who can accurately anticipate their costs. The second effect is the chilling effect on a potential
requester. A requester who is uncertain how extensive the desired agency records actually are and
is uncertain whether the records contain commercially valuable technological information, will be
discouraged from even seeking certain information because of the potential for exorbitant costs.
83. 4 GOV'T DISCLOSURE REP.(P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 2, 2.3 (Feb. 8, 1983); see Memorandum
from Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Rose to Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies (Jan. 7, 1983), reprintedin I GOV'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) 1 300,815 (Feb. 8, 1983).
84. Memorandum, supra note 83. The primary controversy involves interpretation of
whether the disclosure would benefit the general public. As would be expected, the Reagan Administration seeks to restrict the scope of what the courts and agencies have construed to be in the
public interest. The administration directs courts and agencies to evaluate a fee waiver request by
applying five criteria: (1) the interest in disclosure must be a general public interest, not a private
one; (2) records must meaningfully contribute to the public development or understanding of a
subject; (3) denial is appropriate if the records are already available; (4) the requester must have
expertise in the subject area as well as the ability and the intention to disseminate sought data to
the public; and (5) denial is appropriate if the documents are sought for commercial reasons, for
use in litigation, or to find out what the government knows about the requester. Id
85. 4 GOV'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 5, 5.2 (May 10, 1983).
86. 129 CONG. REc. S4426 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1983)(statement of Sen. Leahy).
87. S. 1034, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S4426 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1983).
Section 3 of the bill would amend the FOIA to specifically require that documents shall
be furnished without charge when the information is not requested for a commercial use,
and the request is being made by or on behalf of first, any individual, or any educational
or noncommercial scientific institution, whose purpose is scholarly or scientific research,
second, a person engaged in journalistic activity, or third, a nonprofit group that intends
to make the information available to the general public.
129 CONG. REC. S4427 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1983).
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Justice Department's current policy on fee waivers, however, members
of the public wil be further deterred from pursuing FOIA requests by
the threat of having to bear high costs, even in cases in which release of
88
the information yields benefits to others besides the requesting party.
Rather than encouraging the public's curiosity, the OLP's new guidelines will discourage public interest.
The reasons behind the Reagan Administration's apparent policy
favoring the protection of classified information over public disclosure
considerations are less than clear. The Reagan Administration may be
reacting to a fear of excessive and dangerous leaks of sensitive security
information. Such fear, however, may be ilfounded. There has not
been a sudden increase in the number or severity of leaks; in the past
three years only six leaks have been reported to the ISOO.89 An alternative reason is that "the Administration seems not to give much more
than rhetorical credit to the concept that the public has a serious and
continuing interest in being informed." 90 Such an attitude would be
entirely inconsistent with Congress's purpose in enacting the FOIA: to
facilitate disclosure of information to those whom the government
governs. 9'
III.

JURISDICTION: THE DEFINITION OF AGENCY RECORDS

The FOIA requires government agencies to make available to the
public all agency records that do not faU within one of nine specific
statutory exemptions. 92 If an agency denies an individual's request for
documents the indixidual has recourse to the federal courts. Federal
jurisdiction to review denial of a FOIA request "is dependent upon a
showing that an agency has (1) 'improperly'; (2) 'withheld'; (3) 'agency
records.' "93 Thus, before it can order an agency to produce documents
a court must determine that the document requested is in fact an
88. See supra note 82.
89. Abrams, supra note 71, at 72, col. 5. For a brief discussion of the motivation behind the
"get tough" policy of the present administration, see Reagan's Secrecy Campaign, supra note 77,
at 38. For a brief summary of last year's CIA FOIA processing costs, see 4 Gov'T DISCLOSURE
REP. (P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 4, 4.2 (Apr. 12, 1983).
90. Abrams, supra note 71, at 72.
91. Congress enacted the FOIA to ensure: "that disclosure be the general rule not the exception; ... that the burden be on the government to justify the withholding of a document, not on
the person who requests it;. . . that there be a change in the government policy and attitude."
Attorney General'sMemorandum on the PublicInformation Section of the Administrative Procedure
Act, reprintedin 20 AD. L. REv. 263, 265 (1968).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (a)(4)(B), (b)(l)-(9) (1982).
93. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980)(quoting
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982)).
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"agency record. '94 Four significant cases decided during 1983 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
focus on the question of what qualifies as an agency record.
A. Documents Originatingin OtherAgencies.: McGehee v. CIA.

Somewhat surprisingly, the FOIA does not define "agency record." 95 This omission creates a problem when one agency is in possession of documents generated by another agency; 96 it is unclear whether
such documents are properly considered agency records of the agency
in possession.
In McGehee v. CIA ,97 a case of first impression at the appellate
level,98 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit confronted the problem. A free-lance journalist filed a request with the
CIA for records pertaining to the "Peoples Temple" in Guyana. The
district court determined that because the FBI and Department of State
had generated the documents and then placed them in the CIA's files,
94. Justice Stevens's opinion in Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445
U.S. 136, 150 (1980), suggested that the "correct analysis requires us to confront three separate
questions in thefollowing order: (1) are any of the requested documents 'agency records'? (2) if so,
have any of them been withheld because they are in the legal custody of the agency? and (3) if so,
was the withholding improper?" 445 U.S. at 162 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)(first emphasis added, second emphasis in original). The majority, however, declined to determine if some of the documents in Kissinger were "agency records," having concluded first that
no "withholding" took place. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 150. With respect to certain other documents,
however, the Court addressed the "agency record" question first and, finding the documents in
question not to be agency records, did not proceed to the "withholding" question. Id at 155-57.
95. See McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1106 (D.C. Cir.), rehearinggranted and opinion
vacated in part on other grounds, 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982), of which the FOIA is a part, also fails to provide an adequate
definition. McGehee, 697 F.2d at 1106 n.47. The only other statutory definition of "agency record" defines the term to include "all. . . papers.., made or received by an agency." 44 U.S.C.
§ 3301 (1976). This reference in the Records Disposal Act has, however, been held inapplicable to
the FOIA context. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 345 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Forsham v.
Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183-84 (1979)(this definition "not dispositive of proper interpretation of...
the word in FOIA").
96. The court in McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.) rehearinggrantedand opinion
vacated inparton other grounds, 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983), concluded that the question of
"whether a document in the possession of one agency that originated in another constitutes an
'agency record' . . . is not governed by either the terms of the statute, the legislative history, or
precedent." 697 F.2d at 1108.
97. 697 F.2d 1095, 1105-09 (D.C. Cir.), rehearinggrantedand opinion vacatedinparton other
grounds, 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
98. McGehee, 679 F.2d at 1106. At least one district court had faced the question prior to
McGehee. In Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419 F. Supp. 415 (D.D.C. 1976), the district
court held that a document in the possession of an agency that was originally generated elsewhere
is nevertheless an "agency record." Id at 415.
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they were not the CIA's "agency records." The district court, therefore,
refused to compel the CIA to release the requested information. 99
The court of appeals reversed,l °0 and held that "allrecords in an
agency'spossession, whether createdby the agency itselfor by other bodies covered by the Act, constitute 'agency records'."10
' The court based
its decision on what it understood to be the general principles underlying the Act, in particular that "an informed electorate is vital to the

operation of a democracy."'10 2 Thus it sought to encourage, rather than
to create barriers to, disclosure requests.
The McGehee court recognized that an agency holding documents

might be reluctant to release them if the originating agency still considered them within its control. In order to provide guidance to the hold-

ing agency, the court proposed a nonbinding 0 3 "Sample Procedure for
Processing Documents Originating with Other Agencies."' 0 4 Under
this procedure, if the originating agency indicated that it intended to
99. McGehee v. CIA, 533 F. Supp. 861, 868-69 (D.D.C. 1982). The court of appeals noted
that "at least three agencies, in their regulations promulgated pursuant to FOIA, had adopted the
same position." 697 F.2d at 1106 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See 14 C.F.R. § 310.2(a) (1983)(records
of other agencies in the possession of the Civil Aeronautics Board are not "Board 'records' "); 14
C.F.R. § 1206.101(a) (1983)("The term agency records . . . does not include. . . records of another agency, a copy of which may be in NASA's possession."); 22 C.F.R. § 171.10(b) (1983)(the
"term 'record'. . . does not include copies of the records of other Government agencies (except
those which have been expressly placed under the control of the Department of State upon termi-

nation of another agency)").
100. McGehee, 697 F.2d at 1114.
101. Id at 1109 (emphasis in original). This statement, by its terms, is limited to records

created by the agency with custody of the documents or created by another agency also subject to
the FOIA and in the files of the agency with custody. See id at 1108-09 (distinguishing between
documents in an agency's possession that were created by entities, such as Congress, not subject to
the FOIA and those created by agencies subject to the FOIA).
102. Id at 1108. The court also noted that an underlying principle of the Act "is to give
citizens access to the information on the basis of which government agencies make their decisions,
thereby equipping the populace to evaluate and criticize those decisions." Id at 1108-09.
103. The court did not require that the agency adopt its proposal. It described the proposal
merely as an example of a procedure that would comply with the Act. Id at 1111.
104. Id The full text of the Sample Procedure is:
An agency in possession of documents, responsive to a FOIA request, that it has received
from another agency would forward them to the originating body (in lieu of processing
them itself) if and only if they satisfied an "intent to control" test. Specifically, an intention on the part of the originating agency that it retain the authority to decide if and
when materials are released to the public would have to be made evident by either (i)
explicit indications to that effect on the face of each document or (ii) the circumstances
surrounding the creation and transfer of the documents. To minimize the resultant delay, the referral would have to be prompt and public. In other words, as soon as the
agency retrieved responsive documents, and possibly even before it undertook an examination of their contents to determine whether they were exempt from disclosure, it would
identify those records that originated elsewhere and, if they passed the aforementioned
"intent to control" test, would immediately (i) inform the requester of the situation, (ii)
notify the originating agency and, (ill) if necessary, forward to the latter copies of the
relevant documents. To minimize the burden of the requester, this notification and referral would be accorded the status of a FOIA request; the person seeking information
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retain control of the documents 05 when it transferred them to the hold-

ing agency, then the holding agency should forward FOIA requests for
these documents and, if necessary, copies of the documents themselves,

to the originating agency. The originating agency would then decide
whether to withhold or release the information. 0 6 A requester need

make only one request, and may direct it to any agency in possession of
the documents; the requester would not have to file any subsequent
requests with the originating agency. The court believed that this procedure would "minimize the resultant delay [and] . . .the burden on
the requester.' 107

B. Documents Originatingin Congress: Paisley v. CIA.
A problem also arises when documents generated by Congress are
held in agency files. Congress is not an "agency" for purposes of the
FOIA, 10 8 and its documents are not considered "agency records" subject to FOIA disclosure. 10 9 When Congress transfers these documents
to an agency subject to the FOIA, however, the documents may then
become agency records. In 1978, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit adopted guidelines for determining when congressional documents in the possesion of an agency subject to the FOIA
would thereby be relieved of the duty to submit a separate demand to the originating
agency.
Id (footnotes omitted). The procedure presumes that agencies will process requests for most of
these documents just as they would process requests for records originating within the agency. .d
at 1112.
105. The "intent to control" test is also applied to determine if congressional documents in
agency files are properly considered "agency records." Congressional records over which Congress intends to retain control are not "agency records." See Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 693
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see also infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
106. McGehee, 697 F.2d at 1111. Additionally, the holding agency would notify the requester
that it could not release the documents and that the requested documents had been forwarded to
the (named) originating agency.
107. Id; see supra note 104. McGehee also set out a "Sample Procedure [For] Applying a
Reasonable 'Cut-Off Date to a FOIA Search." Id at 1104. The CIA had established a policy by
which it limited its search to records in its possession on the date the FOIA request was finalized,
which in McGehee was almost two and one-half years before the requester received any documents. Any additional CIA documents generated during that two and one-half year period were
excluded from the search by the CIA's time-of-request cut-off policy; thus, only the documents
generated in the one-month period between the events at the People's Temple and the date of
McGehee's finalized request were the object of the CIA search. Id at 1098, 1100. The court held
that any such temporal cut-off is "only valid when the limitation is consistent with the agency's
duty to take reasonable steps to ferret out the requested documents," Id at 1101 (emphasis in
original), and rejected the notion that a "time-of-request cut-off date is always reasonable," id at
1101 (emphasis in original). For the full text of the sample procedure, see Id at 1104.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 551(l)(A) (1982).
109. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 345, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part on other
grounds, 607 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
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should still be considered congressional documents, and therefore ex-

empt from disclosure. In Goland v. CIA,

°

the court held that such

documents are presumed to be agency records unless Congress has ex-

pressly manifested an intent to exercise control over the records."'
Two years after Goland, the Supreme Court considered a similar
problem. In Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press," 2 the Court reviewed a FOIA request for notes that Henry Kis-

singer had made in his capacity as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. 1 3 Kissinger had stored this material in his
office at the State Department, and later donated it to the Library of

Congress. The Kissinger Court did not adopt the Goland "intent-toretain-control" approach. Instead, the Court examined whether the re-

cipient agency had obtained control of the transferred documents.14
The Court's decision in Kissinger thus cast doubt on the test the District

of Columbia Circuit set forth in Goland." 5
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had to
confront this discrepancy in 1983 when the CIA declined to release

documents it had received from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In Paisley v. CIA," 6 the court found that although the Goland
approach differed from the Supreme Court's in its emphasis, the two

were not incompatible."

7

Both tests provide that transferred docu-

110. 607 F.2d 339, 344-48 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds, 607 F.2d 367
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
111. Goland, 607 F.2d at 347. "Whether a congressionally generated document has become an
agency record... depends on whether under all the facts of the case the document has passed
from the control of Congress and become property subject to the free disposition of the agency
with which the document resides." Id
112. 445 U.S. 136 (1980).
113. The Office of the President had generated the records. That office, like the Congress, is
not an agency for purposes of the FOIA; its records, therefore, are not subject to FOIA disclosure.
Id at 155-56 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprintedin HOUSE
COMM, ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS & SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST
SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 at 219, 232 (Comm. Print
1975)). Thus, both Goland and Kissinger present the same question: under what circumstances do
records generated by an agency not subject to the FOIA become agency records of a FOIA-subject

agency?
114. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 155-57.

115. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
116. 712 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

117. The Paisley court noted that
the cases fit together in standing for the general proposition that the agency to whom the
FOIA request is directed must have exclusive control of the disputed documents. If,
under the Goland standard, Congress has manifested its own intent to retain control,
then the agency-by definition-cannot lawfully "control" the documents within the
meaning of Kissinger, and hence they are not "agency records." Thus we hold that our
Goland approach has survived and is consistent with the Kissinger decision.
Id at 693 (footnotes omitted).
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ments are subject to FOIA disclosure only if they are within the exclusive control of the holding agency. The court explained that if
documents are exempt from disclosure under the Goland standard because Congress has manifested its intent to control the documents, the
holding agency cannot claim to control the documents under the Kissinger standard. The approaches, although not identical, are therefore
complementary.
In Paisley, the District of Columbia Circuit applied the Goland
analysis using a high threshold for determining Congress's intent to
control transferred documents, suggesting a presumption in favor of
disclosure. The court held that a letter from the chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence explicitly requesting the CIA to consider all documents transferred to it as congressional, and not agency,
records was "too general" to be effective.'1 8 The court found that the
documents were "agency records" for the purpose of Paisley's FOIA
request and that it therefore had jurisdiction to compel the agency to
disclose them.
C. Agency Possession or Controk Wolfe v. Department of Health &

Human Services and Teamsters v. National Mediation Board.
Both Goland and Kissinger attached great significance to whether
an agency had control of requested documents in determining whether
those documents qualified as agency records for purposes of the FOIA.
Nevertheless, it remained unclear whether an agency that is in possession of documents is also by definition "in control" of them. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit suggested in Goland
and Paisley that mere possession is not synonymous with control.' 9
The Supreme Court, however, has given apparently inconsistent instructions on this issue. In Kissinger the Court suggested in dictum that
"possession or control is a prerequisite to FOIA disclosure duties."' 20
118. Id at 695.
119. Goland, 607 F.2d at 346-47; Paisley, 712 F.2d at 693.
120. 445 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added). The Kissinger Court did not discuss the significance of
its use of the disjunctive "or," and did not explicitly differentiate elsewhere in its opinion between
possession and control. Indeed, the Court did not discuss "possession" as such at all. Instead, it
declared:
We simply decline to hold that the physical location of the [documents] renders them
"agency records." The papers were not in the control of the [agency] at any time. They
were not generated in the [agency]. They never entered the [agency's] files, and they
were not used by the [agency] for any purpose.
Id at 157. The Court probably engaged in such cursory analysis because it considered the case an
easy one to resolve: "It requires little discussion or analysis to conclude that the lower courts
correctly resolved this question in favor of Kissinger." Id
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Yet, in Forsham v. Harris,12 1 a case decided the same day as Kissinger,
the Court made it clear that mere physical possession of documents
122
might not always be sufficient proof of agency control.

In 1983, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
heard two cases that presented the question whether agency possession
of documents is synonymous with agency control for purposes of the
FOIA. In Wolfe v. Department of Health andHuman Services, 123 the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had denied a re-

quest for documents prepared by then President-elect Reagan's transition team' 24 that were stored in a locked bookcase marked "private" in
the office of an aide to the secretary of HHS. 125 The district court, fo26
cusing only on whether the agency had control of the documents,1
found that the documents were not HHS agency records even though
they were being stored in the HHS offices.' 27
The court of appeals in Wolfe, however, heeded the Supreme
Court's suggestion in Kissinger and conducted separate inquiries into
whether HHS had possession or control of the requested documents.
On the question of possession, the court concluded that there was "no
indication that the documents had ever been within the files of the Department."'12 8 Under the court's reading of Goland, this finding would
have ended the inquiry. 129 But because of the Supreme Court's lan121. 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
122. Id at 185 n.16. Moreover, the Forsham Court appeared not to recognize a distinction
between possession and control. For instance, the Court referred to its judgment, that records that
have not passed from private to agency control are not agency records, as a 'ossessory emphasis."
Id at 185 (emphasis added).
123. 711 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
124. Id at 1078. One court has held that a President-elect's transition team is not an "agency"
within the meaning of that term in the FOIA context. Illinois Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. v.
Department of Labor, 545 F. Supp. 1229, 1231-33 (N.D. Ill. 1982). This issue was not present in
Wolfe, because no FOIA request was made of the transition team.
125. The facts in Wolfe were very similar to those in Kissinger. As the court of appeals in
Wolfe noted:
In both instances the documents were generated by an entity outside the reach of FOIA;
the individual's personal possession of the documents pre-dated his affiliation with the
agency; and the individual brought the documents within the four walls of the agency,
but did not integrate the documents with the agency files or records. In neither case was
there any real nexus between the documents and the agency other than their physical
location.
Wolfe, 711 F.2d at 1080.
126. "[A]Ithough copies of the report are physically located at HHS the report was not generated by HHS, is not within the control of HHS and indeed never entered the Department's files or
was ever used by the Department for any purpose." Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human
Services, 539 F. Supp. 276, 277 (D.D.C. 1982).
127. Id at 277-78.
128. Wo/fe, 711 F.2d at 1080.
129. See id at 1079-80 n.6.

400
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guage in Kissinger, the court also considered whether HHS could have
control of the requested documents although it was not in possession.1 30 The court focused on the same factor that it had used to find
the lack of possession: "the fact that the Department never integrated
these documents into its records system."' 3' It found that this also
demonstrated a lack of agency control,' 32 which in turn warranted the
finding that the documents were not agency records for purposes of the
33
FOIA.1
The decision in Wolfe adhered to the Kissinger Court's dictum that
documents constitute records when the agency is either in posession or
has control of the requested documents. Yet the District of Columbia
Circuit seemed to stray from that position in another case decided during 1983, InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. NationalMediation
Board.134 The Teamsters court reviewed a request by the Teamsters
Union for copies of mailing labels bearing the names and addresses of
Trans World Airline employees eligible to vote in an upcoming representation election. The airline had submitted the labels to the National
Mediation Board so that the Board could furnish election materials to
35
the employees.
The court of appeals, in a short opinion, affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the union's request for the labels. 36 The district
court had held that mailing lists in the Board's possession did not constitute "agency records."' 137 The court of appeals seemed unconcerned
that application of the Kissinger Court's disjunctive test would have led
to a finding that the mailing lists, because they were in the agency's
possession, were agency records. The court explained that because the
district court had ordered the airline to deliver the labels so that the
Board could use them to mail ballots, it had no authority to use the
130. Id
131. Id at 1081. Had the court found possession but no control, however, the application of
the Kissinger test would have caused the court to directly overrule the control-oriented approach

of the District of Columbia Circuit.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id
Id at 1082.
712 F.2d 1495, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id; see United States v. Trans World Airlines, 93 Lab. Cas. (CCH)

13,462 (D.D.C.

1981).
136. Teamsters, 712 F.2d at 1496 (citing Goland, 607 F.2d at 347-48). The court held that "the
Board's transitory possession of the labels, limited to the one-time, attach-and-post use required
by the court order, did not constitute 'control' of the labels by the Board and. . . the labels were
therefore not 'agency records' subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act."
Teamsters, 712 F.2d at 1496.
137. Trans World Airlines v. National Mediation Bd., 97 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,159 (D.D.C.
1982).

Vol. 1984:377]

FREEDOM OFINFOR"AWTIONACT

labels for any other purpose.' 38 Thus, the Board did not have sufficient
control over the mailing labels to warrant a finding that they were
agency records subject to FOIA disclosure.1 39 The court of appeals further relied on the lower court's conclusion' 4° that any decision to disbe made by the originating body, not by
close the documents "should
14 1
the recipient agency."'
The predicament of the Wolfe court points out the dangers inherent in less than precise judicial craftsmanship. In a way that was inconsistent with Forsham, the Supreme Court in Kissinger gave the
impression that either possession or control would alone be sufficient to
make a document an agency record. The court in Wofe was compelled
by its uncertainty to apply literally the Kissinger language. In the factual setting of Wolfe, this misstep caused no harm because neither factor was present. Had the court found possession, but not control,
however, as in Goland, the application of the Kissinger "test" would
have directly overruled Goland and the control-oriented approach in
the District of Columbia Circuit.
The wisest course, at least until the Supreme Court speaks unequivocally on the issue, is to continue to follow the established precedent of the District of Columbia Circuit, as was done by the Teamsters
court. This procedure would allow requesters the convenience of obtaining documents from any agency in possession of them, unless an
agency with a superior claim to the documents, such as the agency
which generated them, wished to retain control over disclosure. A simple possession test would force an agency that might only be a caretaker to make the decision as to the applicability of the FOIA
regardless of the interest and expertise of the originating agency. Further, if possession alone were enough, documents generated by Congress and the Office of the President, which are not subject to the
FOIA, would have to be disclosed if found in the files of an agency to
which the FOIA extends. If the Congress and the President could not
prevent disclosure of documents by "controlling" them, less communication between Congress, the President, and the agencies would surely
result. In the absence of a clearer mandate from the Supreme Court,
138. Teamsters, 712 F.2d at 1496. Judge Wald, dissenting from the appellate court's opinion,
declared: "I am not convinced. . . by the district court's post-order assertions that in authorizing
the Board to order the labels from TWA, it meant to control their use to a one-time only mailing."
She believed that the labels were properly "agency records." Id (Wald, J., dissenting).
139. Teamsters, 712 F.2d at 1496.
140. Id
141. Trans World Airlines v. National Mediation Bd., 97 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
1982)(quoting Goland, 607 F.2d at 347).

10,159 (D.D.C.
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the

analysis, which was followed by the

and

courts, represents the soundest approach.
IV.

EXEMPTION (B)(3) AND THE PRIVACY ACT

Exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA permits agencies to withhold
records that are "specifically exempted from discovery by statute," provided that the statute "(A) requires that the matters be withheld ... in
such a manner as to leave the agency no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding."'' 42 In 1982, a split developed among the circuits over whether the Privacy Act 143 was an
exemption (b)(3) statute. 44 The Courts of Appeals for both the Fifth
and the Seventh Circuits had earlier concluded, after cursory analyses,
that the Privacy Act qualified under exemption (b)(3).1 45 In 1982, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded in
that the
disclosure exemptions under the Privacy Act were not FOIA exemption
47
(b)(3) statutes.1

During 1983, the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Cir-

cuits confronted this question as well; their decisions only contributed
to the previous confusion. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
and
a companion case,149 joined the
142. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
144. For a detailed discussion of the circuit split
that arose in 1982, see Developmentsr-1982,
supra note 2, at 401-02, 407-11. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982). For a discussion of the relationship
Privacy Exemption to
between the two Acts, see generally Kronman,
9 LEGAL STUD. Q. 727 (1980).
145. Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 689-91 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214, 216
(7th Cir. 1979),
444 U.S. 1013 (1980). In
the court held that the FOIA and the
Privacy Act "must be read together, and that the [FOIA] cannot compel the disclosure of information that the Privacy Act clearly contemplates to be exempt." 599 F.2d at 216. The holding in
Painter was more specific; it found that the Privacy Act exemptions applied to FOIA through
exemption (b)(3). 615 F.2d at 691 n.3.
Neither case offered extensive analysis. In
the court's discussion of this issue consisted of one bare paragraph; in
the entire opinion was less than three pages long. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit complained about the brevity of this analysis when it addressed the issue.
Greentree v. United States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 87-88
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
146. 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
147.
at 89. In marked contrast to the
and
opinions, the
examined the statutory language, the legislative history, and developments subsequent to the
FOIA's passage at considerable length.
at 76-88.
148. 717 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1983).
149. 717 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1983)(per curiam),
52 U.S.L.W. 3720 (U.S. Apr. 2,
1984)(No. 83-1045).
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District of Columbia Circuit in holding that the Privacy Act disclosure
exemptions do not qualify as statutes that trigger a (b)(3) exemption. 5 0
After Porter, the circuits were evenly split.' 5 1 Nevertheless, the prodisclosure Greentree/Porterposition probably carried more authority
at the time, both because the two most recent cases had adopted that
position 152 and because the District of Columbia Circuit is recognized
153
to have particular expertise in FOIA litigation.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, did not
retreat in 1983 from its earlier decision. In Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement Administration,154 the court reexamined its position in light of
Greentree andPorter. The court, in a more sophisticated and extensive
analysis than it had employed originally, reaffirmed its earlier decision.
It held "that the Privacy Act's nondisclosure provisions apply to FOIA

requests under FOIA exemption

''
3. 155

Whether the Privacy Act is an exemption (b)(3) statute is an extremely difficult question. 56 Ambiguous statutory language in the PriIn Porter and Provenzano, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Privacy
Act is not the sole means of access to governmental records pertaining to individuals; thus, the
Privacy Act did not effect a partial repeal of the FOIA. Porter,717 F.2d at 799; Provenzano, 717
F.2d at 800.
150. Porter, 717 F.2d at 789; Provenzano, 717 F.2d at 800.
151. See 4 GOV'T DISCLOSURE REP. (P-H) Rep. Bull. No. 10, 10.2 (Oct. 11, 1983).
152. See id.
153. See id.

154. 721 F.2d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3720 (U.S. April 2,
1984)(No. 83-5878).
155. Shapiro, id at 219. The executive agencies are also inconsistent in their assessment of the
Privacy Act in light of exemption (b)(3). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), responsible for issuing Privacy Act implementation guidance to the agencies, see Privacy Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-579, § 6, 88 Stat. 1896, 1909 (1978), proposed in 1983 a revision adopting the view that
the Privacy Act is a (b)(3) exemption statute. Proposed Revised Supplemental Guidance on Implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,359 (proposed Aug. 10, 1983). In April,
1984, OMB adopted a modified version of this proposal which maintained that the "Privacy Act
... reaches the level of specificity under paragraph (b)(3)(B) of the FOIA [5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3)(B)] as a withholding statute." Revised Supplemental Guidance on the Implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,338, 12,341 (1984). The OMB had earlier taken
the opposite position. Implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, Supplementary Guidance, 40
Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,742-43 (1975). The Justice Department has taken the position that the Privacy Act should not prevent the disclosure of documents otherwise disclosable under the FOIA,
28 C.F.R. § 16.57(b) (1983). In 1984, however, the Justice Department adopted a final rule, deleting the language of 28 C.F.R. § 16.71 (1983). See Revision of Department of Justice Regulations
for Implementing the Freedom of Information Act, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,248, 12,252 (1984). In so
doing, the Justice Department noted that it was reflecting the position of the Department in litigation since 1981. Id See, e.g., Porter,717 F.2d at 793-96. The Porter court noted that the "[Justice
Department's] interpretation of the statute has vacillated." Id at 798.
156. See Greentree, 674 F.2d at 76.
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vacy Act has permitted equivocal readings by the courts; 157 similarly,
the Act's legislative history is susceptible to a number of interpretation.158 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in both Porter and
Shapiro.159 Given the hardening of the positions and, for the first time,

a fully developed analysis on each side, the issue is ripe for
resolution.160
V.

TRADE SECRETS AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION

Exemption (b)(4) protects from disclosure "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged
or confidential."'16' In 1983, both the trade secret and the commercial
information prongs of this exemption were the subject of significant
opinions. In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA ,162 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a narrower
definition of "trade secrets" than previous courts had applied. Meanwhile, in 9 to 5 Organizationfor Women Office Workers v. Board of
157. Compare Greentree, 674 F.2d at 79 with Shapiro, 721 F.2d at 220. Section (b)(2) of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(2) (1982)(emphasis added), provides:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records ... to aly
person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior
written consent of. the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the
record would be-. . . (2) required under section 552 of this title [the FOIA] ....
Greentree held that the "any person" language includes persons requesting information about
themselves. Greentree, 674 F.2d at 79. In Shapiro, however, the court read this section as applying
only to third-party requests and held that section d of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1982),
provides the only access for first-party requests under the Privacy Act. Shapiro, 721 F.2d at 221.
Thus, the Shapiro court concluded that the (b)(2) language did not apply to the first-party request
at issue, and did not prevent the Privacy Act from serving as an exemption (b)(3) statute. Id. at
220. The Greentree court had argued that "section (b)(2) of the Privacy Act represents a Congressional mandate that the Privacy Act not be used as a barrier to FOIA access." Greeniree, 674 F.2d
at 79.
158. Compare Greentree, 674 F.2d at 81 ("legislative history supports our interpretation that
section (j)(2) of the Privacy Act ought not be considered a FOIA withholding statute for first
party requesters") with Shapiro, 721 F.2d at 221-22 (the conclusion that Privacy Act is an exemption (b)(3) statute is "fortified by the legislative history of the Act").
159. See supra notes 149, 154. The cases have been consolidated and will be argued together.
See Provenzano, 52 U.S.L.W. 3720 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1984); Shapiro, 52 U.S.L.W. 3720 (U.S. Apr. 2,
1984).
160. In 1980, before the split appeared among the circuits, the question whether the Privacy
Act was an exemption (b)(3) statute was presented to the Supreme Court for the first time. See
Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). See Develop.
ments-1982, supra note 2, at 410-11 (whether Greentree view will prevail is uncertain).
161. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982). The exemption has two prongs. If the requested documents
contain "trade secrets," "they are exempt from disclosure, and no further inquiry is necessary."
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1983). If the documents contain only "commercial or financial information," their exempt status depends on a
showing of privilege or confidentiality. Id
162. 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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Governors of the FederalReserve System,163 the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit rejected a literal application of the prevailing test for
"confidentiality," holding instead that information is confidential for
purposes of exemption (b)(4) if its disclosure would harm an interest
Congress sought to protect through the exemption.
A.

Trade Secrets and Health and Safety Testing Data: Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA.

In determining whether a document requested under the FOIA
contains trade secrets, courts have traditionally applied the definition
in the Restatement of Torts. The Restatement broadly defines a trade
secret as any "compilation of information. . which gives [a business]
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors."' 16 4 In Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit repudiated this definition 65 and adopted
a far narrower one.
The case arose when the Public Citizen Health Research Group
filed a request with the FDA seeking to obtain health and safety testing
data submitted to the FDA by manufacturers of intraocular lenses
(IOLs), a type of prosthesis used in cataract patients. 66 The district
court found that certain of the requested documents contained "trade
secrets" as defined by the Restatement and therefore were exempt from
67
disclosure under exemption (b)(4).1
163. 721 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
164. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1938)("A trade secret may consist of any

formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors or suppliers who do not know
or use it." (emphasis added)).
165. 704 F.2d at 1288.
166. Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)-(k) (1982)), the FDA classified IOLs as investigational devices that could
only be used in clinical studies. See 42 Fed. Reg. 58,874, 58,874-75 (1977); 41 Fed. Reg. 38,802,
38,803 (1976). As a result, manufacturers were required to submit clinical test data, including data
concerning the manufacturer's prior experience with IOLs and any adverse reactions or other
complications, to the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 813.27 (1982); 21 C.F.R. § 813.153(b) (1982). These
clinical testing data were the subject of the request for disclosure.
167. Public Citizen Health Research Group v.FDA, 539 F. Supp. 1320, 1327-30 (D.D.C.
1982). Most of these materials were also exempt under section (b)(4) as "confidential commercial
information." The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding with respect to most of the
"confidential commercial information." 704 F.2d at 1291-92. But the court of appeals rejected the
district court's holding that all of the documents were exempt under exemption (b)(3). The district
court had found that the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 exempted the materials from disclosure. 539 F. Supp. at 1330-31; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982)(materials exempt provided that
they are "specifically exempted from disclosure by [a] statute" which meets certain criteria). The
court of appeals remanded the case with respect to those documents that the agency had sought to
shelter from disclosure only because they contained "trade secrets" and those that fell within
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The court of appeals reversed and held that the district court's use
of the Restatement definition was improper. 68 The court acknowl-

edged that most courts had applied this definition,1 69 but nevertheless
held that the definition was too broad and was therefore inconsistent

with the language and legislative intent of the FOIA. In lieu of the
Restatement definition, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia Circuit adopted a more restrictive definition borrowed from an obscure 1925 District of Columbia Circuit case, United States ex rel
Norwegian Nitrogen Products v. United States Tariff Commission. 170 In
Norwegian Nitrogen the court defined the term trade secret to encompass data detailing the production process, such as an "unpatented, se-

cret, commercially valuable plan, appliance, formula, process or device
that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of
trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either

innovation or substantial effort." 171 This definition did not encompass
"'collateral matters of business confidentiality, such as pricing and
sales volume data, sources of supply and customer lists,' "172 matters
that would be included under the Restatement approach. The Health

Research Group court applied this definition and found that the FDA's
health and safety testing data bore little relation to the disclosing companies' production processes and therefore did not qualify as trade
173
secrets within the ambit of the FOIA's (b)(4) exemption.
exemption (b)(3)'s scope for a determination whether the documents contained "confidential commercial information." 704 F.2d at 1291-92. The court of appeals found that most of the other
documents, not covered by the remand, were not proteced under the "trade secret" exemption but
were exempt nonetheless because they contained "confidential commercial information." Id at
1282.
168. Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1282.
169. Id at 1286 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974)). The
district court characterized the Restatement definition as "by far the most widely accepted." 539
F. Supp. at 1325. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit itself has cited the
Restatement definition in an exemption (b)(4) case. See Washington Research Project, Inc. v.
HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 245 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). The FDA has also
adopted the Restatement definition verbatim. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (1982).
The court of appeals in Health Research Group, however, was "unconstrained by prior administrative orjudicial actions." 704 F.2d at 1287. It maintained that it was bound neither by the
FDA's adoption of the Restatement definition nor by the courts' "mechanical" application of it in
exemption (b)(4) cases. Id at 1288.
170. 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925), vacated as moot, 274 U.S. 106, 112 (1927). During the
forty years before Health Research Group, the NorwegianNitrogen definition had been cited only
once in the trade secret context. See Consumers Union v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 801
n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
171. Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1289.
172. Id at 1287 (quoting Connelly, Secrets andSmokescreens: A Legal and EconomicAnaysis
of Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 207, 230).
173. 704 F.2d at 1290.
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The court gave three reasons for adopting this restrictive definition
of trade secrets. First, the legislative history gave no indication that
Congress intended a broad definition.1 74 Second, a broad definition of
trade secrets, which exempted any information that would give a business a competitive advantage, would render superfluous the confiden-

tial commercial information prong of exemption (b)(4). 175 Third, the
Restatement's focus on litigation between private parties makes it ill76
suited for the FOIA's public law context.'

The impact that the District of Columbia Circuit's restrictive defi-

nition of trade secret will have on the amount of information disclosed
is unclear. Courts adopting this approach will no longer be able to
classify safety data and other information tangential to company pro-

duction processes as trade secrets. Yet, it is entirely possible that the
only effect of this change will be to shift the basis for exemption from

the trade secrets prong of exemption (b)(4) to the confidential commercial information prong. Indeed, precisely this shift in emphasis occurred in Health Research Group. The court of appeals found that
although the documents did not contain trade secrets under the Norwegian Nitrogen definition, most of them did contain confidential com-

mercial information and were thus exempt from disclosure.' 77 The
court's decision will, however, reduce the protection from FOIA disclo-

sure enjoyed by testing data that is not susceptible to classification as
confidential commercial information. Such increased disclosure will

probably intensify pressure on Congress to amend the FOIA to protect
78
business information from disclosure.'

174. Health Research Group, id at 1289; see H.R. REP. No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1978)(Restatement definition inconsistent with the FOIA; endorses Norwegian Nitrogen/Consumers Union approach as "more suitable for FOIA").
175. Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1289.
If a trade secret can be any information used in a business which gives competitive advantage, then there is little or no information left that could qualify as commercial or
financial information under the second category of the exemption without also qualifying as a trade secret. This [Restatement] defnition is therefore inconsistent with the language of the act....
Id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978))(emphasis supplied by court).
176. Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1289.
177. See supra note 167.
178. For a discussion of congressional efforts to protect commercial information submitted to
the government, see supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
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B. Confidential CommercialInformation and CongressionalPurpose:
9 to 5 Organization for Women Office Workers v. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The test to determine whether information is exempt under the
confidential commercial information prong of FOIA exemption (b)(4)
also underwent revision in 1983. Since 1974, most courts have used the
two-part test set out by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NationalParksand ConservationAssociation v. Morton 179
to determine whether commercial information submitted to the government should be considered confidential. This test required a court to
examine whether disclosure would "(1) impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2).

.

. cause sub-

stantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the
information was obtained."180 The NationalParks court believed that
this formula was consistent with the congressional purpose behind exemption (b)(4) of encouraging businesses to submit complete information to agencies and protecting them from competitive harm that could
ensue from such disclosure.1l8
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refined this test in 9 to 5
Organizationfor Women Office Workers v. Board of Governors of the
FederalReserve System. 182 The case concerned a request to disclose
certain correspondence from the Boston Salary Survey Group to the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The Federal Reserve Bank had used
this information to set salary levels for its employees. The district
court, applying the NationalParks standard literally, held that the requested documents were useful but not necessary to the Bank and were
83
therefore not exempt from disclosure.'
The court of appeals vacated this decision. It held that the term
"necessary" did not mean "absolutely essential"; instead, in keeping
with congressional intent, the term should be construed "to protect information which would beparticularlyhelpful to agency officials in car84
rying out their mandate."'
179. 498 F.2d 765,770 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a9d inpartand rev'd inpartsub noma. National Parks
and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see, e.g., Orion Research, Inc. v.
EPA, 615 F.2d 551 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); American Airlines v. National
Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1978).
180. NationalParks, 498 F.2d at 770.
181. Id at 767-70.
182. 721 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
183. 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Federal Reserve Sys., 551 F. Supp. 1006, 1010
(D. Mass. 1982).
184. 9to5, 721 F. 2d at 10 (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals rejected the assertion that National Parks
protected only the two congressional purposes embodied in its stan-

dard. 85 The Federal Reserve Board argued that the National Parks
test arbitrarily protected those two interests, to the exclusion of

others 86 such as ease of compliance and program effectiveness. In effect, the Board read NationalParks as permitting an exemption only if
it was justified by one of the two policy interests singled out in National
Parks.187
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 9 to 5, declared this

analysis "unduly restrictive." 188 Noting that NationalParks had itself
left open the question of whether other governmental interests might
justify an exemption,189 the court held that NationalParks did not im-

pose "a limitation on the number of legitimate interests which are protected by exemption 4."190 The 9 to 5 court treated the two-prong test
merely as one instance of what it took to satisfy the underlying principle of NationalParks, namely that information is confidential only if

its "disclosure will harm a specific interest that Congress sought to protect by enacting the exemption."' 9' Under this modified standard, the

crucial inquiry is whether disclosure will harm "an identifiable private
or governmental interest which the Congress sought to protect."' 92 The
government will bear the burden of identifying that interest and of
showing how it will be harmed by the disclosure of the requested
193
information.
185. The court explained:
If it can be demonstrated with particularity that a specific private or governmental interest will be harmed by the disclosure of commercial or financial information, the Government should not be precluded from invoking the protection of exemption 4 merely
because the asserted interest is not precisely one of those two identified in [National
Parksr].
Id at 9-10.
186. Id at 8.
187. Id
188. Id
189. Id In NationalParks, the court noted: "We express no opinion as to whether other
governmental interests are embodied in this exemption." 498 F.2d at 770 n.17. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also reserved the question whether other interests
merited protection under this prong of exemption (b)(4) in Washington Post Co. v. United States
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 268 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A district court held
in 1979 that exemption (b)(4) embodied the interest of program effectiveness. Comstock Int'l v.
Export-Import Bank of the United States, 464 F. Supp. 804, 807-08 (D.D.C. 1979).
190. 9 to 5, 721 F.2d at 9; see supra note 185.
191. 721 F.2d at 9; see NationalParks, 498 F.2d at 767 ("A court must also be satisfied that
non-disclosure is justified by the legislative purpose which underlies the exemption. Our first task,
therefore, is to ascertain the ends which Congress sought to attain in enacting the exemption
. . . .1).

192. 9 to 5, 721 F.2d at 10.
193. Id

410
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The test promulgated in 9 to 5 is by its own terms broader and
more inclusive than the NationalParks test that it seeks to supplant.
The effect that the change will have on the amount of information
properly considered confidential will likely be small, however. The NationalParks standard protects the two most frequently threatened interests.' 9 4 A disclosure that fails to threaten those two interests, but

offends other interests, is likely to be relatively rare.
VI.

THE NONDISCOVERABLE DOCUMENTS EXEMPTION

Although the FOIA grants the public access to a great deal of information, Congress did not intend it to become a vehicle for circumventing civil discovery rules. In order to assure that the public could
obtain only those inter- and intra-agency memoranda that a private
party could discover in the course of litigation with the agency,195 Congress included section (b)(5). The (b)(5) exemption protects from disclosure documents traditionally afforded protection pursuant to
evidentiary privileges in the civil discovery context. 196 Courts have interpreted the language of section (b)(5) as encompassing materials that
would be protected under the attorney-client privilege, 97 the attorney
work-product privilege, 98 and the executive deliberative process
privilege. 199
In 1983, the Supreme Court addressed the duration of the (b)(5)
exemption afforded documents covered by the attorney work-product
doctrine in FTC v. Grolier,Inc. 200 Grolier filed a request with the FTC
for materials the agency had prepared for a suit against a Grolier subsidiary in 1978. Because the FTC's suit against Grolier had been dismissed with prejudice, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that FOIA exemption (b)(5) no
longer applied to the FTC's documents concerning the suit. The court
explained that "attorney work-product from terminated litigation re194. Id at 9 ("The court in [NationalParks] identified the two interests which are most frequently threatened by the disclosure of commercial or financial information.").
195. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1973); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982).
196. Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Exemption (b)(5) exempts from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982).
197. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862-64 (D.C. Cir,
1980); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252-55 (D.C. Cir.

1977).
198. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 (1975); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,
598 F.2d 18, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
199. NLRB V. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-54 (1975).
200. 103 S. Ct. 2209 (1983).
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mains exempt from disclosure [under the FOIA] only when litigation
related to the terminated action exists or potentially exists." 20 ' The

court of appeals considered exemption (b)(5) coextensive with the privilege rules for discovery of attorney work product in civil proceedings.
Extending the protection of exemption (b)(5) only to subsequent related cases, the court believed, "best comports with the fact that the
privilege is qualified, not absolute." 20 2 The court argued that the hold-

ing was particularly appropriate in the FOIA context because
"[d]isclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.

' 20 3

The Supreme Court reversed and held that an agency's attorney
work-product is exempt from disclosure under exemption (b)(5) "with-

'2°4
out regard to the status of the litigation for which it was prepared.
The Court based its holding on two independent grounds. First, the

Court stressed that the literal language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) 20 5 "protects materials prepared for any litigation. . so
long as they were prepared by or for a party to the subsequent litiga-

tion." 20 6 Because exemption (b)(5), by its own terms, "requires reference to whether discovery would normally be required during litigation
with the agency," the Grolier Court held that rule 26(b)(3) dictates that
201. Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 671 F.2d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(emphasis in original). The court
of appeals adopted the "related-litigation" test, one of three approaches to the question from the
civil discovery context. It considered this to be the intermediate view. Id at 555-56. At one
extreme, courts have held that the privilege applies only if the material subject to the discovery
request was prepared in anticipation of the same case; documents from one case are, according to
this view, discoverable in any other case. See, e.g., United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 154, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). At the other extreme, some courts hold that the privilege perpetually protects the
materials from discovery. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326,334 (8th Cir. 1977). The intermediate approach protects materials from discovery in a subsequent case only if the cases are related.
See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Co., 381 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1967).
There is little authoritative precedent on the question in the civil discovery context because
most cases dealing with the subject are decided at the district court level; few discovery questions
reach the appellate level because, under the final order doctrine, interlocutory orders are not appealable. See Note, Discovery ofan 4ttorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DuKE
L.J. 799, 817 n.95.
202. Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 671 F.2d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
203. Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 671 F.2d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Dep't of the Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)),
204. Grolter, 103 S. Ct. at 2215.
205. Id Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents. . . prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party . . .only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he
is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means. In ordering disclosure of such materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
206. Grolier, 103 S.Ct. at 2215.
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the FTC's litigation documents fall within the scope of exemption
The Grolier Court, however, did not rely solely on a technical construction of Rule 26. It believed that Congress intended to incorporate
208
into exemption (b)(5) the relevant case law on pretrial discovery.
Therefore, to find alternative support for its construction of exemption
(b)(5), the Court reviewed the case law construing the language of rule
26(b)(3). It found that most of the lower federal courts had interpreted
the rule as providing continuing immunity for attorney work product
even after the litigation for which the documents were prepared had
ended, and "without regard to whether other related litigation is pending or is contemplated. '20 9 Consequently, the Court refused to order
the FTC to release the documents it had withheld under the FOIA's
(b)(5) exemption because Grolier could not have discovered the documents in a civil proceeding governed by rule 26(b)(3). The Grolier
Court effectively created an absolute exemption under the FOIA for
documents that at any previous time would have qualified as nondiscoverable attorney work product.
The Grolier decision may have its largest impact outside of the
FOIA context. It is entirely possible that the opinion may be read as
resolving the question of the duration of the civil discovery privilege
outside of the FOIA context as well.2 10 Justice Brennan, who concurred in the judgment, noted, for instance, that neither the FOIA nor
the caselaw permitted the Court to define the scope of the privilege
under exemption (b)(5) any differently than in an ordinary civil lawsuit. ' 21 1 He did "not understand the Court's holding. . . to be limited
to the FOIA context. '21 2 The majority opinion, however, is not clear
on the applicability of its holding in the general civil discovery context;
it was at pains, for instance, to note that "[w]hatever problems such a
construction of Rule 26(b)(3) may engender in the civil discovery area,
it provides a satisfactory resolution to the question . . . under the
FOIA. '' 21 3 Whether this ruling will resolve the question in the civil
207. 103 S.Ct. at 2210.
208. Id

209. Id. Justice Brennan, who concurred in the first prong of the Court's analysis, dissented
from this reasoning, arguing that he knew "of no other statutory context inwhich the test. . . is
not what the correct view of the law is, but what the current majority view is." Id at 2218 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement)(emphasis in original).
210. For a brief survey of the approaches to the duration of the privileges in the civil discovery
context, see supra note 201.
211. Grolier, 103 S. Ct. at 2217 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
212. Id
213. Id at 2213.
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discovery context at large will ultimately depend on its reception and

interpretation in the lower courts.
VII.

THE PERSONAL PRIVACY EXEMPTION

Section 552(b)(6) of the FOIA authorizes agencies to withhold
"personnel and medical records and similar files the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

' 214

The purpose of the exemption is to protect the individual's

right to privacy while providing public access to governmental
21 5

records.
In 1983, exemption (b)(6) was the subject of two significant deci-

sions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
American Federationof Government Employees v. United States,2 16 de-

termined that the personal privacy exemption could be used to prevent
disclosure of the names and addresses of government employees, a

holding inconsistent with several earlier cases. 2 17 In the other significant 1983 case, Arieff v. United States Department of the Navy,2 18 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that if an agency invokes exemption (b)(6) it must show more than
a "mere possibility of an invasion of privacy. ' 2 19 Although its holding
was compelled by precedent, 220 theArieff court was clearly troubled by
the result. 22 1 Therefore, the court suggested that Congress might
broaden exemption (b)(6) to protect records that, although they do not
directly identify particular individuals, might fuel speculation about
22 2
their medical conditions.
214. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
215. "The phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a policy that
will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from
unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to government information." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1965); see Department of the Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
216. 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983).
217. See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
675 (D.C. Cir. 1971); infra notes 231-40 and accompanying text.
218. 712 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
219. Id at 1465-66.
220. The Arieffcourt noted that "[a]bsent ... revision. . . existing Supreme Court law cannot be stretched to afford protection in the present case." Id at 1471.
221. The court noted, for instance, that the principles enunciated in its opinion "will not satisfy all of the justifiable concerns that some members of Congress may have." Id
222. Id
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A. BalancingPublic and PrivateInterests. American Federation of
Government Employees v. United States.
In Government Employees, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit created confusion as to whether name and address lists in
agency files could be subject to FOIA disclosure. In evaluating an
agency's denial under exemption (b)(6) of a request for documents, a
court is required to balance the privacy right of the individual named
in the documents against the right of the public to be informed. 223 The
Courts of Appeals for both the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit had previously ordered agencies to disclose such lists
despite agency claims under exemption (b)(6) that the individual's privacy interest outweighed the interest in disclosure. These decisions suggested that the courts did not believe that such disclosure would ever
implicate substantial privacy interests. In Government Employees, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit changed its position.
It upheld the Department of Health and Human Service's decision to
224
withhold a list of the names and addresses of its employees.
The party requesting the lists in Government Employees was a
union representing 20,000 federal employees, of whom some 5000 were
union members. The union sought the names and addresses of the employees it represented so that it could communicate directly with
them. 225 The district court refused to order disclosure of the lists, holding that nondisclosure was justified under the FOIA personal privacy
exemption. 226 The court of appeals affirmed per curiam, holding that
227
the public interest was not significant enough to warrant disclosure.
Although the Government Employees court acknowledged that
"collective bargaining is a matter of grave public concern, '2 28 it asserted that any benefit from disclosure would "inure. . . to the union,
in a proprietary sense, rather than to the public at large. ' 229 Because
disclosure of the information might subject the employees to mailings
223. The balancing test used here is one contemplated by Congress and approved by the

Supreme Court. "Congress sought to. . . require a balancing of the individual's right to privacy
against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act. .. " Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976); see supra note 204.
224. 712 F.2d at 933.
225. GovernmentEmployees, 712 F.2d at 932. A union official testified before the district court
that the union had had difficulty communicating with the bargaining unit employees, in part because the management had frustrated union attempts to communicate by tampering with the
union's newsletter. Id
226. Id
227. Id at 933.
228. Id at 932; see also 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1982)("labor organizations and collective bargaining
in the civil service are in the public interest").
229. 712 F.2d at 932.

Vol. 1984:377]

FREEDOM OFINFORMA41TION A CT

and personal solicitations, the court held that the employees' "strong
privacy interest" in keeping their home addresses confidential
2 30
prevailed.
The holding in GovernmentEmployees is difficult to reconcile with
two earlier cases. In Getman v. NLRB, 2 31 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the disclosure of the names and
addresses of union members.2 32 A law professor conducting a study of
union election procedures had sought the list to facilitate the collection
of survey data. In another case, Robles v. EPA ,233 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit upheld an order compelling the EPA to disclose
documents that included the names and addresses of homeowners
whose building lots contained uranium tailings used as fill dirt. 234 Both
courts held that the (b)(6) exemption applied only to "intimate details
of a highly personal nature" 235 and that names and addresses did not
qualify as such.236 The analysis in these older cases suggests that
names and addresses might never be exempt from disclosure, 237 yet the
Government Employees court upheld such an exemption.
Chief Judge Winter echoed the reasoning of Getman andRobles in
his vigorous dissent in Government Employees. He argued that the
'238
"right to privacy in one's home address is an interest of little value.
He asserted that disclosure of the federal employees names and addresses was appropriate because Congress has recognized that "labor
organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the
public interest. ' 239 Because communication with those employees that
the union is obligated to represent is essential to effective representation, disclosure of the lists would serve both the union's and the public
2
interest. 40
The Government Employees decision is likely to have a substantial
impact. The decision will encourage agencies not to release information about private individuals even when that information reveals only
230. Government Employees, 712 F.2d at 932. Judge Winter's dissent concluded, however,
"that the balance tilt[ed] in favor of disclosure." Id at 933 (Winter, C.J., dissenting). For a proposed revision of exemption (b)(6) that would codify the GovernmentEmployees holding, see supra

note 35.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id at 674-77.
484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
Id at 844-48.
Robles, 484 F.2d at 845; see Getman, 450 F.2d at 675.
Getman, 450 F.2d at 675.

237. Id at 674.
238. Government Employees, 712 F.2d at 933 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
239. Id at 934 (Winter, C.J., dissenting)(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1982)).
240. Government Employees, 712 F.2d at 934 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
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such mundane details of a person's life as his employer and his home
address, details that the average person rarely tries to keep secret.
B. Speculative Invasions of Privacy and the Needfor Revision of the
(b)(6) Exemption.
In Arieff v. United States Department of the Navy, 241 a journalist
sought documents disclosing the names and amounts of prescription
drugs supplied by the Navy to the Office of the Attending Physician to
the United States Congress. 242 The district court refused to compel disclosure, finding that, although the records sought "[did] not, on their
face, contain personal details of any individual's medical condition, '243
disclosure would effect a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" for two reasons.244 First, the requested documents, when combined with other publicly available information about individuals and
about which drugs are used to treat certain diseases, would reveal the
medical conditions of particular individuals.2 45 Second, even if the requested documents did not reveal which congressmen suffered particular maladies, the disclosure would only fuel speculation about their
medical conditions.2 46 Therefore, the court held that FOIA exemption
(b)(6) justified the Navy's refusal to disclose these drug records.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 247 In doing so, it focused on the test that the Supreme Court
enunciated in Department of the Air Force v. Rose. 248 In Rose the
Court observed that the privacy exemption "was directed at threats to
privacy interests more palpable than mere possibilities. ' 249 The Arieff
court, in turn, held that the Navy had established only a "mere possi241. 712 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
242. Id at 1464. The request explicitly indicated, however, that the Navy could delete all of

the information that would identify the ultimate recipient of any drug. Id at 1465.
243. Id at 1466.
244. Id
245. Id

246. Id
247. Id at 1471-72. The district court had exempted all of the information requested, even
that for which "nothing whatever in the record indicated that any invasion would result." Id at
1467. With respect to these documents the court of appeals noted the "district court's complete
failure to restrict application of the Exemption to those 'segregable portions' of the records producing the alleged invasion of privacy would alone require our reversal of the judgment." Id;
see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982)("Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided
• ..after deletion of the portions which are exempt .
248. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
249. Id at 380 n.19.
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bility" that any individual's medical condition would be disclosed. The
250
Navy therefore could not make use of the privacy exemption.
The court of appeals was also unimpressed with the district court's
concern for protecting individuals from speculation fueled by the disclosure of agency records concerning their medical conditions' 1 The
court emphasized that the "text of. . .Exemption [(b)(6)] does not apply to an invasion of privacy produced as a secondary effect of the re-

lease. ' 252 The FOIA requires that for the privacy exemption to apply
the disclosure itself of the record must "constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. ' 253
The Arieff court asserted that its decision was correct under ex-

emption (b)(6) as it is currently written and was compelled by the
Supreme Court's holding in Rose. Nevertheless, the court was uncomfortable with the outcome. 254 It believed that the concerns of individual members of Congress about "erroneous or speculative attribution
of a medical condition" were justified. 255 The court was also concerned

that people other than members of Congress could be harmed by the
widespread release of agency records containing medical information.

But the court believed that amending legislation was necessary to solve
the problem and concluded its opinion by suggesting "the need for a

more general revision of Exemption
VIII.

6."256

PRO SE ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS

The FOIA provides that a "court may assess against the United
States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case. . . in which the complainant has substantially pre250. Ari f, 712 F.2d at 1467. On remand, the Navy would have the opportunity to establish
more than a "mere possibility" that the medical condition of a particular individual would be
revealed if the requested information was disclosed. The court intimated that such a showing with
respect to some segregable portions of the records was "conceivable." Id at 1469.
251. Ari f, 712 F.2d at 1468. The court held that "the text of the statute, its legislative history,
and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it are united in contradicting such an approach." Id
252. Id (emphasis in original).
253. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982); see also Rose, 425 U.S. at 371. "It is only the identifying
connection to the individual that casts the personnel, medical, & similar files within the protection
of [the] sixth exemption." Id
254. Arieff, 712 F.2d at 1471; see supra note 221.
255. Arieff, 712 F.2d at 1471. The court argued that it could not alleviate Congress's concerns
because the Supreme Court had specifically rejected the argument that the clause, "the disclosure
of which constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy," modifies only the last of the three
categories of files enumerated in exemption (b)(6) ("personnel and medical files and similar
files"). See Rose, 425 U.S. at 370-71; see also supra note 220.
256. Arieff, 712 F.2d at 1471. For one proposed revision of exemption (b)(6) that might satisfy
the concerns of the Arieff court, see supra note 35 and text accompanying notes 36-38.
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The purpose of this provision is not to punish the

government for noncompliance with the FOIA, but to encourage prospective litigants to seek the advice of counsel.2 58 The eligibility of pro

se litigants for fee awards under this provision has been in question for
some time.259 No court of appeals that has addressed the issue, with

the significant exception of the District of Columbia Circuit, 260 has
awarded attorney fees to nonattorney pro se litigants. 261 During 1983,
however, a split developed between the circuits over whether attorney

pro se litigants may recover attorney fees. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, which routinely denies fees to nonattorney pro se litigants,262 permitted a fee award to an attorney pro se litigant. 263 But,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which in 1983 denied fees to
257. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982). Once a plaintiff has been found to have substantially
prevailed, the trial judge has discretion whether to award fees. In determining if a plaintiff has
substantially prevailed, courts consider whether the "prosecution of the action could reasonably
be regarded as necessary to obtain the information" and whether "the action had a substantial
causative effect on the delivery of the information." Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc.
v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1976). In exercising their discretion, courts utilize four criteria: "I) The benefit to the public deriving from the case; 2) The commercial benefit to the claimant; 3) The nature of plaintiffs interest in the records sought; [and] 4) The basis for the
government's withholding of the requested documents." Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1371 n.4
(11th Cir. 1982).
258. See Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1981)("Congress did
not intend to impose a penalty on the United States"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1982).
259. The first split between circuits on this issue developed in 1977. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit found that pro se litigants are precluded from receiving attorney fees. Burke v.
Department of Justice, 559 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977), af'g 432 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Kan. 1976).
A short time later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that pro se
litigants are not precluded from recovering such fees. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir.
1977), af'g Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976).
260. The exception is significant for two reasons. First, a large portion of FOIA litigation
takes place within the District of Columbia. Second, under the terms of the Act, any plaintiffmay
bring a FOIA action in the District of Columbia. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
261. See Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1371 (1lth Cir. 1982); Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d
383, 388 (3d Cir. 1981); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir. 1981)(court
analyzed Privacy Act fee shifting provision, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B) (1982), identical to the FOIA
statutory provision, under FOIA standards), cert. denied 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1980).
In Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980), the court denied
fees to a nonattorney pro se litigant on the ground that none of the litigant's time was diverted
from income producing activity; the court left open the possibility that other nonattorney pro se
litigants might recover fees.
The District of Columbia Circuit permits fee awards to nonattorney pro se litigants. See Cox
v. Department of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir.
1977), af'g Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976).
262. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir. 1981).
263. Cazalas v. Department of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1983). The District of
Columbia Circuit first permitted attorney pro se litigants to recover fees in Cuneo v. Rumsfeld,
553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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nonattorney pro se litigants, 264 found no basis under the Act for distinguishing between nonattorney and attorney pro se litigants. 265 It therefore denied fees to an attorney pro se litigant.
In Wolfel v. United States,266 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit adopted "what appears to be the increasingly well-settled rule
that apro se litigant who is not an attorney may not recover attorney
fees pursuant to the FOIA." The court based its holding on two considerations. First, encouraging prospective litigants to consult with attorneys, by reimbursing them for their attorneys fees, will reduce
unnecessary litigation. 267 Second, to "award an attorney fee where no
fee has been incurred constitutes a penalty for non-compliance," a re268
sult not intended by Congress.
Less than one month later, in Falconev. IRS, 269 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declared that the "same reasons which led us
.. . to deny attorney's fees topro se non-lawyer FOIA plaintiffs apply
with equal validity to pro se attorney plaintiffs. 270 The court found
that, although a pro se attorney litigant may have the requisite legal
expertise, he or she "is unlikely to have 'the detachment and objective
perspective' necessary to fulfill the aims of the Act."' 27 1 The court reit-

erated that because pro se litigants incur no legal costs, an award of
272
costs would serve only to punish the government.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had previously held
273
that the FOIA precludes fee awards to nonattorney pro se litigants.
It, however, expressly left open the question whether attorney pro se
264. Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983).
265. Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983). Ironically, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld attorney fee awards to nonattorney pro se litigants because, having already approved of awards to attorney pro se litigants in Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553
F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the court was unable to distinguish attorney and nonattorney
pro se litigants. Cox v. Department of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Fifth Circuit's disparate treatment of attorney and nonattorney FOIA litigants appears to be unique, although some circuits, having decided that nonattorney pro se litigants are precluded from fee
awards, have continued to reserve the question as to attorney pro se litigants. See, e.g., Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 385 n.l (3d Cir. 1981).
266. 711 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1983).
267. Id at 68.
268. Id; see supra note 258.
269. 714 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983).
270. Id at 647.
271. Id The court compared its analysis to that used by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923
(1980), in which the court denied fees to pro se attorney litigants in Truth in Lending Act cases.
Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647-48.
272. Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647.
273. See Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 950 (1982).
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litigants may receive such an award. 274 In 1983, the court resolved this
question, holding in Cazalas v. Department of Justice275 that attorney
pro se litigants may receive fee awards. It argued that because Congress
intended to encourage legal representation, "it makes sense to compensate lawyers for this work."276 The court also found that assessing the
value of the pro se litigant's time is easier when the litigant is an
277
attorney.
Currently, only the District of Columbia Circuit has awarded attorney fees to both attorney and nonattorney pro se litigants. 278 The
Sixth Circuit denies fees to both attorney and nonattorney pro se litigants, 279 while the Fifth Circuit denies fees to those pro se litigants who
are not attorneys, while allowing fees to those who are.280 The Second
Circuit has adopted yet another approach. It allows both nonattorney
and attorney pro se litigants to recover fee awards provided that, in
pursuing the litigation, they were forced to divert time away from income-producing activities.281 No nonattorney has yet collected fees
under this provision, however. Several of the other circuits deny fees to
nonattorney pro se litigants, but have not yet addressed the question
with respect to attorney pro se litigants. 282 This multiplicity of approaches is likely to continue until the Supreme Court resolves the conffict. As recently as 1982, the Court was unwilling to do so.283
IX.

CONCLUSION

In 1983, Senator Hatch reintroduced his Freedom of Information
Reform Act, which would substantially restrict the scope of the FOIA.
Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration continued to erode the underlying foundation of the FOIA by issuing, but later rescinding parts of,
National Security Decision Directive No. 84 that would have permanently censored government employees handling classified information. These and other nonjudicial developments reflect the trend in
274. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 455 U.S.

950 (1982).
275. 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983).
276. Id at 1057.
277. Id;see Crocker v. Department of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (Ist Cir. 1980)(the "impro-

priety of allowing the layperson litigant an attorney fee award is further underscored by the lack
of any meaningful standard for calculating the amount of such an award").
278. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
281. See Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980).
282. See supra notes 261, 265.
283. See Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
950 (1982).
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recent years to restrict the application of the FOIA in order to reduce
the burdens it places on the agencies and the courts.
The 1983 judicial developments do not signal this same singular
progression. In three instances, two different courts reached conflicting
conclusions on substantially similar issues. In American Federation of
FederalGovernment Employees v. United States, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit expanded the scope of protection of the FOIA
(b)(6) personal privacy exemption, while the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit applied an admittedly narrow interpretation of (b)(6) to uphold the disclosure of information likely to be damaging. A similar pair of conflicting results emerged with regard to
exemption (b)(4) in Public Health Research Group v. FDA and 9 to 5
Organizationfor Women Office Workers v. Board of Governorsfor the
Federal Reserve System. In Public Health the court contracted the
scope of protection encompassed by the term "trade secrets," whereas
in Nine to Five a different court expanded the scope of "confidential
commercial information." A clear split of authority also developed
with respect to the awarding of attorney fees for pro se attorney litigants in Falcone v. IRS and Cazalas v. Department of Justice.
In other court action concerning the FOIA, the Supreme Court
extended the length of protection provided by the FOIA (b)(5) interand intra-agency memoranda exemption. In addition, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit repeatedly addressed the
issue of what constituted an agency record, and adhered to the standard developed six years before in Goland v. CIA.
Although the 1983 judicial decisions have not drastically curtailed
the FOIA's disclosure provisions, both the Reagan Administration policies and Senator Hatch's proposed amendments to the FOIA pose a
threat to continued public access to government files. Despite Congress's enthusiastic reception of the Hatch Bill to date, the bill reflects
increasing support for government withholding of information from
the public.
Kevin Condrin Dwyer
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